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ABSTRACT   
 
Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) is characterized by Metacognition/Mentalization defi-
cits and Emotion Dysregulation (ED). BPD’s first-choice treatment is psychotherapy, but a 
comprehensive model for this disorder has not yet been formulated, consequently also treat-
ments result controversial. 
 
Study 1:  
Aims: to examine the relationships between Metacognitive Functions and ED and other clini-
cal features in a BPD sample.   
Methods: Seventy patients were assessed for the inclusion and 45 BPD patients were includ-
ed. Metacognitive functions were evaluated with Metacognition Assessment Interview (MAI). 
Specific self-reports measured respectively: ED (Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale, 
DERS), Alexithymia (Toronto Alexithymia Scale, TAS), Impulsiveness (Barratt Impulsive-
ness Scale, BIS), Mood (Beck Depression Inventory; BDI), Interpersonal Sensitivity (Inven-
tory of Interpersonal Problems, IIP) and general psychopathology (Global Severity Index 
(GSI) of SCL-90).  
A Structural Equation Model (SEM) was used to evaluate the relations between variables.  
Results: SEM showed that TAS score resulted a mediator between MAI total score and DERS 
score and DERS significantly predicted BIS, BDI, IIP and GSI scores.   
Conclusions: The general level of psychopathology and the other clinical variables seemed 
directly linked to ED. ED didn’t seem to correlate directly to Metacognition, but indirectly 
through Alexithymia. 
 
Study 2:  
Aims: to compare the effect of 1-year Metacognitive Interpersonal Therapy (MIT) and Men-
talization Based Therapy (MBT) vs TAU (Treatment as usual) on Metacognition functions, 
ED and other clinical features in a BPD sample.   
Methods: Forty-five patients were divided in 3 groups: MIT (N=14), MBT (N=16) and TAU 
(N=15). MAI scores were the primary outcome, DERS, TAS, BIS, BDI, IIP and GSI of SCL-
90 scores were the secondary outcomes.  
Linear Mixed model were used for the longitudinal evaluation of the results.   
Results: MAI total score improve in both experimental groups, but only MIT group statistical-
ly differ from TAU, probably due to the small sample size. Between Metacognition sub-scales 
Differentiation and Integration played a central role. Secondary outcomes improved, but the 
effect wasn’t statistically significant.  
Conclusions: Differentiation and Integration played a central role both in MIT and MBT.  
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PART 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 1: Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) 
       
1.1 A brief history of the definition and epidemiology 
 
 The term ‘borderline personality’ was proposed for the first time in the United States 
by Adolph Stern in 1938. Stern described a group of patients who ‘fit frankly neither into the 
psychotic nor into the psychoneurotic group’ and introduced the term ‘borderline’ to describe 
what he observed because it ‘bordered’ on other conditions (Stern, 1938). Afterwards Otto 
Kernberg (1975) introduced the term “borderline personality organization” to refer to a con-
sistent pattern of functioning and behavior characterized by instability and reflecting a dis-
turbed psychological self-organization. From these first conceptualizations to nowadays the 
study of the Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) has been characterized by a great debate. 
Whatever the purported underlying psychological structures, the cluster of symptoms and be-
havior associated with borderline personality were becoming more widely recognized 
(Clarkin, et al.  2007), and included striking fluctuations from periods of confidence to times 
of absolute despair, markedly unstable self-image, rapid changes in mood, with fears of aban-
donment and rejection, and a strong tendency towards suicidal thinking and self-harm (APA, 
2000). Although BPD is a condition that is thought to occur globally (Gunderson, et al. 2011), 
there has been little epidemiological research into the disorder outside the western world.  
 In primary care, the prevalence of Borderline Personality Disorder ranges from 4 to 
6% of primary attenders (Lenzenweger, et al. 2007). Compared with those without personality 
disorder, people with BPD are more likely to visit their GP frequently and to report psychoso-
cial impairment (Grant, et al., 2008). In spite of this, BPD appears to be under-recognized by 
general psychiatrist (Paris, 2010). In mental healthcare settings, the prevalence of all person-
ality disorder subtypes is high, with many studies reporting 30-60 % of BPD between patients 
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diagnosed with personality disorders (Torgersen, 2009). Borderline personality disorder is 
generally the most prevalent category of personality disorder in mental healthcare settings. In 
community samples the prevalence of the disorder is roughly equal male to female, whereas 
in clinical services there is a clear preponderance of women, who are more likely to seek 
treatment. It follows that the majority of people diagnosed with personality disorder, most of 
whom will have borderline personality disorder, will be women (Banzhaf, et al, 2012).  
   Historically, BPD has been viewed as a disorder, which is notoriously difficult to treat, evi-
denced by high levels of patient drop-out during therapeutic interventions, high number of 
comorbidity with other personality disorders, severe symptom disorders (depression, PTSD 
and anxiety disorders), alcohol ⁄ drug abuse and behavioral disorders (eating disorders, self-
destructive behavior) (Barnicot, 2011), often showing chronic self-harming behaviors 
(Linehan, et al. 1991; Oumaya, et al. 2008), and present a lifetime risk of suicide estimated to 
be up to 10% (Jørgensen,  2009). 
 
1.2 Diagnostic criteria of BPD 
 The course of borderline personality disorder is very variable. Most people show 
symptoms in late adolescence or early adult life, although some may not come to the attention 
of psychiatric services until much later (Zanarini, et al., 2003). Diagnosis itself represent a 
problem (Clarkin, et al, 2007) due to its definition and because it’s not always diagnosed ac-
curately or separated from primary mood disorders (Paris, 2013). Diagnostic criteria of BPD 
is described in axis II of DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000), that state that at least five criteria on the 
nine is necessary to make a diagnosis, so that there are more than 200 combination to get a di-
agnosis and at the same time it is possible for two people to satisfy the criteria and yet have 
very different personalities (see fig. 1 in Appendix for DSM-IV diagnostic criteria). Since its 
introduction in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III) (APA, 
1980), the hypothesis of a possible overlap between BPD and mood disorders, in particular 
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bipolar disorder (Gunderson & Phillips, 1991), has been highly controversial. Furthermore 
there’s still nowadays a great problem of overlap between criteria belonging to different per-
sonality disorder, in fact patients meeting criteria for a specific personality disorder frequently 
also meet criteria for other personality disorder. This heterogeneity and the clinical features 
described above make it also difficult to be investigated. Diagnosis and etiology remain still 
nowadays a central theme of investigation with repercussions also on treatment research, in 
fact to manage these patients effectively, one first has to recognize the disorder (Paris, 2013), 
that results still underdiagnosed. The new version of DSM-5 (APA, 2013), published in may 
2013, suggests an alternative model for personality disorder. This new approach, located in 
section III as alternative and not substitute to preserve continuity with current clinical prac-
tice, consider personality disorder characterized by impairments in personality functioning 
and pathological personality traits. Each disorder is defined by a specific pattern of impair-
ments and traits (see the diagnostic criteria for BPD in Appendix, Fig. 2).  
In the categorical approach, mostly used, the diagnosis is based on symptoms that have been 
present since adolescence or early adulthood and appear in multiple contexts (APA, 2013), 
and there are no laboratory or imaging tests that can help with the diagnosis (Paris J, 2008). A 
number of structured and semi-structured interviews can assist in making the diagnosis and 
the most frequently used is the SCID II (First, et al., 1996), based on DSM-IV (APA, 2000) 
criteria. When interviewing patients, four domains of symptoms must be explored: affectivity, 
impulse control, interpersonal functioning and cognitive domain, that can help to distinguish 
BPD from other disorder.   
1. Three criteria refers to the “affectivity domain” and they are the presence of “affective in-
stability due to a marked reactivity of mood ... that lasts hours to rarely more than a few 
days”; “inappropriate and intense anger” and “a chronic feeling of emptiness” (APA, 2000).  
These frequent mood changes may appear to overlap with bipolar disorder, but there are sev-
eral clear distinctions. First, the duration of the fluctuations is shorter than in bipolar disorder. 
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The second difference is the persistence of affective instability throughout life, rather than 
during a discrete mood episode. The third difference is reactivity of mood. The mood symp-
toms of patients with BPD are triggered by external events and are particularly sensitive to 
perceived rejection, failure and abandonment (Zanarini, at al, 2008). Mood usually shifts be-
tween depression and anger, and euphoria is transient. Shifts between depression and euphoria 
are more frequently seen in bipolar disorder (Henry C, et, 2001).  Moreover several study 
suggest that negative emotions, such as anger, may persist for longer and be more intense in 
patients with the disorder than in healthy controls (Lobbestael&McNally, 2015).  
2. The impulsive symptoms of borderline personality disorder may be more recognizable to 
clinicians, but they can still pose diagnostic challenges. This domain encompass self-harm 
and suicidality, but also many other behaviors, including gambling, spending, binge eating, 
sexual promiscuity and substance abuse, that are associated with an increased risk of complet-
ed suicide (McGirr, et al, 2007). 
3. A pattern of unstable relationships, marked by extremes of idealization and devaluation and 
“to make frantic efforts to avoid abandonment” are characteristic of the interpersonal domain 
and they are two of the most important symptoms in making an accurate diagnosis of BPD, 
with studies reporting high level of sensitivity and peculiarity (Johansen, et al, 2004; Fossati, 
et. 1999). Identity disturbance is the other interpersonal symptom and it included a lack of 
consistently invested goals, values, ideals, and relationships; a tendency to make temporary 
hyper-investments in roles, value systems, world views, and relationships that ultimately 
break down and lead to a sense of emptiness and meaninglessness; gross inconsistencies in 
behavior over time and across situations that lead to a relatively accurate perception of the 
self as lacking coherence; difficulty integrating multiple representations of self at any given 
time; a lack of a coherent life narrative or sense of continuity over time (Westen&Cohen, 
1993). 
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4. Finally the more common symptoms in “Cognitive domain” are depersonalization and dis-
sociation, but also psychotic symptoms could be present and we can distinguish from schizo-
phrenia because usually they are much more likely to be short, circumscribed, and either 
based in reality or totally fantastic (Zanarini & Frankenburg, 2007).  
1.3 Models of the disorder 
   Beyond the diagnostic difficulties, the causes of BPD are complex and remain partly uncer-
tain. No current model has been advanced that is able to integrate all of the available evi-
dence. Different factors contribute to its development: genetics and constitutional vulnerabili-
ties; neurophysiological and neurobiological dysfunctions of emotional regulation and stress 
(Linneahn, 1993); psychosocial histories of childhood maltreatment and abuse; and disorgani-
zation of aspects of the affiliative behavioral system, most particularly the attachment system 
(Morse et al, 2009). Summarizing contributions from different branches of research, individu-
als constitutionally vulnerable and/or exposed to influences that undermine the development 
of social cognitive capacities, such as neglect in early relationships, develop with an impaired 
ability both to represent and to modulate affect and effortful control attentional capacity. 
These factors, with or without further trauma, exemplified by severe neglect, abuse and other 
forms of maltreatment, may cause changes in the neural mechanisms of arousal and lead to 
structural and functional changes in the developing brain (O’Neill & Frodl, 2012). So the bio-
logical and psychosocial pathways to BPD are extremely complex (Fonagy&Bateman, 2008) 
and so far no model has been advanced that is able to integrate all the available data. Consid-
eration has to be given to the role of genetics and constitutional vulnerabilities, neurophysio-
logical dysfunctions of affect regulation and the stress response (Martin-Blanco, et al, 2015), 
evidence concerning the limbic system, executive control and frontal cortex dysfunction, psy-
chosocial histories of childhood maltreatment and abuse  (Reed et al, 2015) found in a signifi-
cant proportion of cases, and the disorganization of aspects of the affiliative behavioral sys-
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tem, most particularly the attachment system, found in almost all individuals with a diagnosis 
of BPD.  
1.3.1 Mentalization, Metacognition and Emotion Dysregulation 
    An interesting model considering all these areas it’s the model that focuses on the devel-
opment of mentalization by Bateman&Fonagy (2004). The model suggests that disruption of 
the attachment relationship early in development in combination with later traumatic experi-
ences in an attachment context interacts with neurobiological development. The combination 
leads to hyper-responsiveness of the attachment system which makes mentalizing, the capaci-
ty to make sense of ourselves and others in terms of mental states, unstable during emotional 
arousal. This unstable or reduced mentalizing capacity is the core feature of BPD in this mod-
el, and the emergence of earlier modes of psychological function at these times accounts for 
the symptoms of BPD (Fonagy&Bateman, 2008). Mentalization is the capacity to make sense 
of each other and ourselves, implicitly and explicitly, in terms of subjective states and mental 
processes. Understanding other people’s behavior in terms of their likely thoughts, feelings, 
wishes, and desires is a major developmental achievement that, probably, biologically origi-
nates in the context of the attachment relationship. The capacity to understand self and others 
as being guided by aims and intentions is considered to be a key developmental achievement 
and the disruption of this is seen to be a major aspect in the psychopathology of BPD. The 
most important cause of such disruption is psychological trauma early or late in childhood 
which undermines the capacity to think about mental states or the ability to give narrative ac-
counts of one’s past relationships. Even the capacity to identify the mental states associated 
with specific facial expressions may be impaired. This reduced capacity for mentalizing may 
be speculatively attributed to one or more of at least four processes: (1) the vulnerable child’s 
defensive inhibition of the capacity to think about others’ thoughts and feelings in the face of 
the experience of the genuine malevolent intent of others; (2) early excessive stress which dis-
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torts the functioning of arousal mechanisms, resulting in the inhibition of orbitofrontal corti-
cal activity (arguably the location of one of the neural systems involved in mentalizing); (3) 
the fact that any trauma arouses the attachment system, leading to an intensified search for at-
tachment security and a deactivation of reflective capacity. Where the attachment relationship 
is itself traumatizing such arousal is exacerbated because, in seeking proximity to the trauma-
tizing attachment figure, the child may be further traumatized. Such prolonged activation of 
the attachment system may have specific inhibitory consequences for mentalization; (4) the 
child, in “identifying with the aggressor” as a way of gaining illusory control over the abuser 
may internalize the intent of the aggressor in an alien (dissociated) part of the self. While this 
might offer temporary relief, the destructive intent of the abuser will in this way come to be 
experienced from within rather than outside of the self, leading to unbearable self-hatred.  
    Brain abnormalities identified in borderline patients are consistent with the suggestion that 
a failure of representation of self-states is a key dysfunction in BPD. Some evidence suggests 
that the anterior cingulate cortex plays a key role in mentalizing the self (Frith & Frith, 2003) 
but also the prefrontal cortex, the mesial prefrontal cortex, the parieto-temporal junction, and 
the temporal poles constitute a network of areas that are invariably active when mentalizing 
activity is taking place (Gallagher & Frith, 2003). Moreover current evidence suggests that 
genes have both main effects (Torgersen, 2000; White, et al, 2003) and interactive effects 
with anomalous environmental influences (Caspi et al., 2002, 2003). Moreover the mentaliza-
tion theory of BPD suggests that individuals either constitutionally vulnerable and/or exposed 
to influences that undermine the development of cognitive capacities necessary for mentaliza-
tion such as neglect in early relationships (Battle et al., 2004) where the contingency between 
their emotional experience and the caregiver’s mirroring is not congruent (Crandell et al, 
2003), develop with an enfeebled ability both to represent affect and effortful control atten-
tional capacity (Posner et al., 2002). Early trauma may also cause changes in the neural mech-
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anisms of arousal leading to a relatively ready triggering of the arousal system underpinning 
posterior cortical activation in response to relatively mild emotional stimuli.  
   In the MBT model, it’s not attribute a central role to trauma, but it’s expected that in indi-
viduals made vulnerable by early inadequate mirroring and disorganized attachment to highly 
stressful psychosocial experiences in an attachment context, trauma will play a key role in 
shaping the pathology of BPD and will contribute to directly causing it by undermining the 
capacity for mentalization. The impact of trauma is most likely to be felt as part of a more 
general failure of consideration of the child’s perspective through neglect, rejection, excessive 
control, unsupportive relationship, incoherence, and confusion. These can devastate the expe-
riential world of the developing child and leave deep scars which are evident in their social-
cognitive functioning and behavior (Fonagy&Bateman, 2008). This aspect of the MBT for-
mulation therefore converges with that advanced by Marsha Linehan concerning the assump-
tion of invalidating family environments and creatively developed further by Fruzzetti et al. 
(2005). According to Linehan (2006), BPD is primarily a disorder of emotion dysregulation 
and emerges from transactions between individuals with biological vulnerabilities and specif-
ic environmental influences. The dysfunction proposed by Linehan is one of broad dysregula-
tion across all aspects of emotional responding. As a consequence, individuals with BPD have 
(a) heightened emotional sensitivity, (b) inability to regulate intense emotional responses, and 
(c) slow return to emotional baseline. Furthermore, from Linehan’s perspective, the construct 
of emotion (and thus of emotion dyregulation) is very broad and includes emotion-linked 
cognitive process, biochemistry and physiology, facial and muscle reactions, action urges, and 
emotion-linked actions. Emotion dysregulation subsequently leads to dysfunctional response 
patterns during emotionally challenging events. Linehan suggested a number of possible bio-
logical substrates of emotional dysregulation (e.g., limbic dysfunction). However, the litera-
ture on the biology of psychological disorders was extremely limited when Linehan first ar-
ticulated her theory.  
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In addition, Linehan proposed that the development of BPD occurs within an invalidating de-
velopmental context. This invalidating environment is characterized by intolerance toward the 
expression of private emotional experiences, in particular emotions that are not supported by 
observable events. Furthermore, although invalidating environments intermittently reinforce 
extreme expressions of emotion, they simultaneously communicate to the child that such 
emotional displays are unwarranted and that emotions should be coped with internally and 
without parental support. Consequently, the child does not learn how to understand, label, 
regulate, or tolerate emotional responses and instead learns to oscillate between emotional in-
hibition and extreme emotional lability. The child also fails to learn how to solve the prob-
lems contributing to these emotional reactions.  
    In Italy the “Terzo Centro di Terapia Cognitiva”, located in Rome, has developed an anoth-
er model that combines the cognitive approach with the concept of metacognition. This ap-
proach is called Metacognitive Interpersonal Therapy (MIT) and it’s a cognitive behavior-
based psychotherapeutic approach that works to increase metacognitive abilities and to im-
prove interpersonal relationships (Dimaggio, Semerari, Carcione et al 2006; Dimaggio, Car-
cione, Salvatore, et al. 2010). Metacognition, as formulated by Semerari (Semerari, et al. 
2003; Carcione, et al. 2008), refers to a broad set of cognitive and affective skills which allow 
people to identify mental states, reasoning about them, and ascribing them to themselves and 
others. These skills allow us to recognize the reason why a person reacts psychologically ac-
cording to some regularities and constructs personal meaning over their lifespan (Semerari et 
al, 2012). Metacognition (Semerari et al., 2003) partially overlaps with similar constructs 
such as mentalization (Bateman & Fonagy, 2004; Allen, et al., 2008) and Theory of Mind 
(ToM) (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, Frith, 1985), but with some differences. Compared to ToM, 
metacognition usually includes more complex mental functions. Additionally, metacognition 
also refers to emotional understanding, while ToM mainly focuses on cognitive attribution 
(Semerari et al, 2012). Compared to the general definition of mentalization given by Bateman 
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and Fonagy (2004), Semerari’s concept differs since it considers mind-reading to be a general 
ability created by different sub-functions that interact with each other and that can be selec-
tively impaired (Semerari, et al. 2003). Dysfunctions in metacognition are associated with low 
social functioning, low quality of life, psychopathology and symptoms of several psychiatric 
and personality disorders seem to predict worst treatment response (Semerari et al., 2007; 
Lysaker, et al., 2010a, Lysaker, et al, 2010b; Carcione, et al., 2011; Lysaker, et al., 2011; 
Ogrodniczuk, et al., 2011). Moreover recently Semerari et al. (2012) showed that PDs pre-
sented a high correlation between metacognitive dysfunctions and the general severity of per-
sonality pathology. However, the data also show that when the severity of personalities’ pa-
thology was controlled, patients with different personality styles still present specific difficul-
ties in metacognitive skills. In particular, the mindreading profile of BPD seems to be defined 
by two specific disabilities. Bateman and Fonagy (2004) suggested that these patients have 
problems distinguishing between internal mental representations and external reality, oscillat-
ing between a state where every representation is experienced as real and a state where the 
outside world seems imaginary and unreal. Clarkin et al. (1999) emphasized the BPD pa-
tient’s inability to consider multiple and contradictory representations of himself/herself and 
of others. Consistently with these clinical observations, Semerari et al. (2005), using the Met-
acognitive Assessment Scale (MAS) to analyze therapy sessions of patients with BPD, found 
that the most impaired metacognitive sub-functions were the ability to differentiate between 
representation and reality (differentiation) and the ability to reflect on varied and contradicto-
ry mental representations to construct a unified and coherent narrative (integration). In a later 
study, Semerari et al. (2015) showed that patients with BPD typically presented an “instabil-
ity” personality style, which correlated to a specific profile of metacognitive dysfunctions 
characterized by poor differentiation and poor integration. Therefore, poor differentiation and 
poor integration seem to be the “typically borderline” metacognitive profile. This indication 
was also supported by the logistic regression analysis in their study which confirmed that in-
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tegration and differentiation, along with global severity, were the main features which predict 
and identify participants of the BPD group. This result is consistent with previous studies that 
highlighted the difficulty of patients with BPD to distinguish between mental representations 
and reality and to integrate contradictory internal representations (Semerari et al., 2005, 
2014). These results are also consistent with several clinical observations (Bateman and 
Fonagy, 2004). Poor differentiation implies that the individual perceives his/her own repre-
sentations not as subjective and hypothetical scenarios but as objective, unquestionable fact, 
concrete realities that call for direct action (Bateman and Fonagy, 2004). Borderline patients 
are impulsive and they have a tendency to act out; it is plausible that the specific metacogni-
tive dysfunction in differentiation plays a role in generating their behavioral dyscontrol. Dys-
functional integration, on the other hand, means that the individual finds it difficult to reflect 
on the contradictions inherent in his own thoughts and feelings. A specific impairment of in-
tegration is consistent with the characteristic difficulties encountered by these pa- tients in 
forming a stable self-image and stable representations of interpersonal relations. Additionally, 
comparisons of other metacognitive sub-functions, such as monitoring and decentering, in the 
BPD and PD groups produced further interesting insights. Monitoring scores in the two 
groups were very similar in mean scores, both before and after controlling for general severi-
ty. This indicates that difficulty in recognizing thoughts and emotions, which constitute men-
tal states, could not be considered a defining characteristic of borderline patients in particular, 
but rather of PDs in general. In contrast, when decentering was assessed, the borderline group 
performance emerged as weaker than that of the control group. This difference remained con-
stant even after general severity was taken into account, although it became no longer statisti-
cally significant. This impairment in decentering in the BPD group is comparable to the lack 
of cognitive empathy observed in other studies (New et al., 2012; Hengartner et al., 2014). 
Cognitive empathy involves the ability to consider other people’s mental states, while dis-
counting one’s own viewpoint and degree of personal involvement (perspective taking). 
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Nonetheless, New et al. (2012) highlighted that difficulties in cognitive empathy in BPD do 
not necessarily imply a similar difficulty in emotional empathy; borderline patients are, in-
deed, well able to understand other people’s emotions quickly and intuitively.  
    In the last years literature has grown on this topic and focused on difficulties in emotion 
regulation, in addition to scarce mentalization/metacognitive abilities, as core features of BPD 
(Sharp, Pane, Ha, et al. 2011).  Emotion dysregulation is the inability to flexibly respond to 
and manage emotions. Although this definition may appear straightforward, there is consider-
able variation in the phenomena studied under the heading of emotion dysregulation in BPD. 
Some researchers have focused on emotion sensitivity, others on affective intensity or affec-
tive lability, still others on emotional vulnerability, and so on (Carpenter & Trull, 2013). This 
is not surprising, given the complexity of the construct. One way to understand these dispar-
ate approaches is to view emotion dysregulation as a process, incorporating multiple interac-
tive components, and not as an end-state (Werner & Gross, 2010).  
    Studies involving the use of magnetic resonance imaging or positron-emission tomography 
in patients with BPD have shown a hyperesponsive amygdala and impaired inhibition from 
the prefrontal cortex during tasks involving exposure to facial expressions, reactions to emo-
tionally charged words, and interpersonal cooperation (King-Casas, Sharp, Lomax-Bream et 
al, 2008). There is evidence that neuro-hormones, such as oxytocin and opioids, mediate the 
exaggerated fears of rejection and abandonment that are characteristic of BPD (Stanley & 
Siever 2010). Emotion dysregulation (ED) has been conceptualized in different ways, howev-
er, alternative conceptualizations vary in the importance they attribute to the interpersonal 
context in which emotions are regulated. At one end of the spectrum is the view that interper-
sonal relationships and ED are closely and inevitably intertwined. The exemplar is attachment 
theory, which some proponents argue is "fundamentally about emotional experiences and 
their regulation" (Tidwell, et al., 1996). In this view, insecure attachment styles (especially 
preoccupied, unresolved, and disorganized variants) are likely to be associated with ED 
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(Levy, et al 2005). At the opposite pole is the view that negative emotionality or neuroticism 
shapes both subjective experience and expressive style and permeates both social and nonso-
cial contexts uniformly. In this view, a predisposition to intense, negative affect and limited 
capacity for executive control of such affect is fundamental to ED (Tidwell, et al, 1996). A 
third view, which also credits the reciprocal relationship between interpersonal functioning 
and ED, asserts that ED occurs in relation to the contrasting demands of different kinds of so-
cial interaction. We refer to difficulties regulating behavior and emotions in a way that is con-
sistent with the expectations for different kinds of social interaction as domain disorganiza-
tion (Morse, et al, 2009). 
   Beyond the ED is conceptualized, environmental influences also appear to be important in 
the pathogenesis of the disorder; insecure attachment, childhood neglect or trauma, and family 
psychiatric problems are recognized as risk markers, with the impossibility for the child to 
build a clear ideas of self and other. Ability of mentalization is in fact strictly connected with 
ED (Choi-Kain & Gunderson, 2008) and several evidence suggests that BPD patients experi-
ence core deficits in mentalizing (Bateman & Fonagy, 2004) or metacognition (Semerari, 
Carcione, Dimaggio et al 2007).  
Metacognition is the general capacity to think about thinking (Semerari, et al., 2003); it in-
volves a wide range of semi-independent faculties that allow an individual to manage com-
plex mental states and to cope with interpersonal problems. A deficit in metacognition would 
limit someone’s ability to perform discrete tasks, such as recognizing what triggers one's 
emotions, taking a critical distance from one's ideas or forming a mature theory of the another 
person’s mental states (Semerari et al., 2012). Individuals with personality disorders (PD) 
have difficulty modulating their mental states and cope with interpersonal problems according 
to a mentalistic formulation of the problem (Carcione et al 2011). Patients with BPD show 
mentalization problems including deficits in monitoring and identifying emotions, inability to 
integrate different mental states, or failure to distinguish between one’s inner world and ex-
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ternal reality; these dysfunctions, and emotion dysregulation can account for many of the clin-
ical phenomena commonly observed in BPD (Fonagy, 2012; Semerari et al., 2005). Further-
more, poor metacognitive abilities have been directly linked with an inability to cope with 
problems that arise from living with others, and difficulty employing effective problem-
solving strategies and adaptive behaviours (Carcione et al., 2011).  
    In conclusion, although growing evidence in the field of BPD, the conceptualization of the 
disorder remains very complex and a comprehensive model has not yet been formulated; con-
sequently also treatments result controversial.  
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Chapter 2: Treatment for BPD 
 
2.1 Pharmacologic and not-pharmacologic treatment  
    As reported in APA guidelines (APA, 2001), NICE guidelines (2009) and in the systematic 
review of the Cochrane collaboration (Stoffers, et al, 2010; Stoffers, et al 2012) core feature 
of BPD as the ones described in the introduction, and avoidance of abandonment, chronic 
feelings of emptiness, identity disturbance, and dissociation were not found to be affected 
significantly by any drug.  
    Drugs are useful to improve specific target symptoms but currently, there is no RCT evi-
dence-based “gold standard” for the pharmacological treatment of BPD (Stoffens, et al, 
2010).   
Principles for choosing specific medications most used and recognized as guideline for the 
treatment are reported by the American Psychiatry Association (APA, 2001) and include the 
following:  
_ Treatment is symptom specific, directed at particular behavioral dimensions.  
_ Affective dysregulation and impulsivity/aggression are risk factors for suicidal behavior, 
self-injury, and are given high priority in selecting pharmacological agents.  
_ Medication targets both acute symptoms (e.g., anger treated with dopamine-blocking 
agents) and chronic vulnerabilities (e.g., temperamental impulsivity treated with serotonergic 
agents).  
Symptoms to be targeted are divided in three groups: Affective dysregulation symptoms, Im-
pulsive behavioral symptoms and Cognitive-perceptual symptoms and each of this has specif-
ic recommendation (see Fig. 6.3, 6.4, 6.5 in Appendix). 
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Otherwise in the last decade, psychotherapy has been identified as the treatment of first 
choice for patients with BPD (Zanarini, 2009), although the mechanism of change remains 
partly unknown (Fonagy & Bateman, 2006).  
 
2.2 Psychotherapy for BPD 
     Controlled trials provide support for the effectiveness of various forms of psychotherapeu-
tic treatments, such as Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT; Linehan et al., 2006), Schema-
Focused Therapy (SFT; Giesen-Bloo et al., 2006), Transference-Focused Psychotherapy 
(TFP; Clarkin, et al, 2007), Systems Training for Emotional Predictability and Problem Solv-
ing (STEPPS; Blum et al., 2008), and Cognitive Behavior Therapy (CBT; Davidson et al., 
2006). However, no single treatment model has been established as the primary treatment of 
choice and few study has been conducted outside the sites of the development of the respec-
tive BPD treatment model, consequently, replication by independent groups is urgently re-
quired (Jorgensen, et al., 2012). To date, only eight randomized outcome studies have been 
conducted outside the sites of the development of the respective BPD treatment models. 
Koons et al. (Koons et al., 2001) and Verheul et al. (Verheul, et al., 2003.) compared DBT (6 
and 12 months respectively) with treatment as usual. Carter et al. (Carter et al. 2010) com-
pared 6 months DBT with TAU and waiting list. All three studies found that DBT was supe-
rior to TAU on some but not all outcome measures. McMain et al. (2009) compared 1-year 
DBT with a manualized version of general psychiatric management as described in the APA 
practice guidelines for BPD treatment (Oldham et al., 2001). They found no significant differ-
ences between the two groups. Similarly, Feigenbaum et al. (2012) found practically no sig-
nificant differences in outcome between 1 year of DBT and TAU. In a comparison of the ef-
fectiveness of 3 years of TFP and SFT, Giesen-Bloo et al. (2006) found that significantly 
more patients in SFT recovered or showed reliable clinical improvement on a BPD severity 
index compared with patients in TFP. However, this study has been criticized for insufficient 
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integrity checks (indicating inadequate therapist adherence) of the delivered TFP treatment 
(Yeomans F, 2007). Pribe et al. (2012) studied the effectiveness of DBT in a randomized con-
trolled design. Finally, in a comparison of 1-year TFP with psychotherapy in the community, 
(Doering, et al., 2010) it was found that TFP was superior on selected outcome measures like 
BPD symptomatology, psychosocial functioning and personality organization.  
    Overall, the results indicate that intensive therapeutic interventions are more effective than 
treatment as usual for patients with BPD (Carter, et al, 2010); however, the question of 
whether any one therapeutic intervention model provides greater clinical advantage to BPD 
patients than the other intervention models remains unclear.  
 
2.3 Mentalization Based Treatment and Metacognitive Iinterpersonal Treatment 
    As mentioned before, In Italy the “Terzo Centro di Terapia Cognitiva”, located in Rome, 
has developed an original model that combines the cognitive approach with the concept of 
metacognition.  This approach is called Metacognitive Interpersonal Therapy (MIT) and it’s a 
cognitive behavior-based psychotherapeutic approach that works to increase metacognitive 
abilities and to improve interpersonal relationships (Dimaggio, et al 2006; Dimaggio, et al. 
2010). Metacognition, as formulated by Semerari (Semerari, et al. 2003; Carcione, et al. 
2008), refers to abroad set of cognitive and affective skills which allow people to identify 
mental states, reasoning about them, and ascribing them to themselves and others. These 
skills allow us to recognize the reason why a person reacts psychologically according to some 
regularities and constructs personal meaning over their lifespan (Semerari et al, 2012).  
    Although the differences of theorizing the construct of mentalization/metacognition the aim 
of the MIT is similar to the MBT one, that is to improve these functions through the therapeu-
tic relationship. The aim of Metacognitive Interpersonal Therapy (MIT) should be to interrupt 
the circuits arising between metacognitive malfunctioning, problematic states of mind and in-
terpersonal cycles (Dimaggio, et al, 2007). In particular, to improve life quality requires pa-
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tients to create new narrative scenarios with which to master wider areas of their relational 
lives (Livesly, 2012) and improve their metacognitive skills (Semerari, et al. 2003), so as to 
have a greater choice of possible future and acquire new tools for understanding their prefer-
ence and desires creating and maintaining intimacy and a sense of belonging to groups, steer-
ing the carrying out of tasks and correcting forecast (Dimaggio, et al, 2007).  
   In MIT’s formulation of the disorder metacognitive problems, problematic states of mind 
and interpersonal cycles, and impoverished narratives give rise to pathogenic cycles; treat-
ment should aim at interrupting them and stimulating the virtuous ones. Therapist should cre-
ate conditions necessary for technical intervention, first of all regulating emotional atmos-
phere and favor condition in which metacognition skills could be improved through discus-
sion about own inner states and the patient’s ones. Working on the therapeutic relationship 
constitutes the main intervention tool with these patients, aimed to getting away from patho-
logical interpersonal cycles, regulating emotional one and improving metacognition (Safran & 
Muran, 2000). Therapist should focus first on their inner states and try to pinpoint their own 
feelings and states of mind and then asked themselves what in their own experience is similar 
or complementary to their patients. Achieving good inner self-discipline interrupts a cycle, as 
it blocks antiterapeutic actions and transport therapists to an empathetic position. This opera-
tion occurs in a therapist’s mind (Dimaggio, et al, 2007). Disrupting pathological cycles ther-
apist could help patients to work on his inner states, improving consciousness and metacogni-
tive skills.   
     In a similar way Mentalization Based Therapy (MBT, Bateman&Fonagy, 2004) aims to 
create a “good environment” to allow the patients to enhance mentalization. The therapist us-
es largely unconscious techniques to activate the attachment system, through: 1. the discus-
sion of current attachment relationship, 2. the discussion of past attachment relationship and 
3. the therapist’s encouragement and regulation of the patient’s attachment bond to him/her by 
the creation of an environment that promotes the patient’s regulation affect. Starting with rela-
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tionship that have relatively low levels of involvement and only gradually to focus the pa-
tient’s thinking on relationship closer to the patient’s core self, therapists promote self-
reflection and metacognition functions (Bateman & Fonagy, 2006).   Albeit implicit, mentali-
zation/metacognition is basis of different psychotherapeutic approach for Borderline Person-
ality Disorder, the choice to focus on and compare just MIT and MBT rise from the fact that 
these two approach have as their primary and explicit outcome precisely the improvement of 
these functions. To our knowledge no study has been conducted on a direct comparison of 
different approach with the same primary outcome on metacognition functions. This feature 
represents the originality of this project.  
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PART 2. EXPERIMENTAL PART 
 
Chapter 3:  
STUDY 1: CROSS-SECTIONAL STUDY 
  
3.1 Introduction to the cross-sectional study and aims 
 As mentioned before, the conceptualization of BPD remains very complex and a compre-
hensive model has not yet been formulated. In the last years literature has grown on this topic 
and focused on difficulties in emotion regulation (ED) and scarce mentalization abilities as 
core features of BPD (Sharp, Pane, Ha, et al. 2011), but the relationship between these varia-
bles and with the other clinical features remains unclear.  
   Emotion dysregulation plays a central role in the etiology and development of BPD (Werner 
et al, 2010), giving rise to affective instability (defined as marked intensity, reactivity, and 
variability of moods) as well as other symptoms of the disorder such as identity disturbance, 
interpersonal dysfunction, and self-harm (Carlson et al, 2009). On the other hand to regulate 
effectively our own emotions, we must first recognize them with mentalization abilities 
(Fonagy&Bateman, 2006). Similarly, to be able to build a coherent self-image and a stable 
view of the people we relate to, we have to form realistic representations of the emotions, ide-
as, aims, values, and intentions which underpin behavior and shape our own mental states and 
those of others (Semerari et al, 2015) These skills are called metacognitive abilities. So, diffi-
culties in emotion regulation (ED) and scarce mentalization/mentalization abilities are linked, 
but the relationship between them and in which way they influence the other clinical variables 
remains still unclear. Few studies assessed all these variables at the same time and there’s no 
agreement on the relationship between them.  
For these reasons in this cross-sectional study we collected data in order to examine the rela-
tionships between Metacognitive Functions and Emotion Dysregulation (ED) and other clini-
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cal features as Alexithymia, Impulsiveness, Mood and the General level psychopathology in a 
BPD sample.   
 
3.2 Methods  
 3.2.1 Study population 
BPD patients were recruited in 3 different psychiatric clinic: the hospital IRCCS San Giovan-
ni di Dio, located in Brescia, the Mental Health Service of Savona and the CIRDIP, located in 
Pavia. The first one is a clinical and research center dedicated to the Mental Health, the sec-
ond one is a community mental health service and the last one is an outpatient service, spe-
cialized in Personality Disorder treatment.  
Inclusion criteria were:  
_ Meet DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) criteria for BPD (see Fig. 6.1 of the  appendix);  
_ Age at baseline between 18 and 45 years; 
_ Able to provide informed consent. 
Exclusion criteria:  
_ Lifetime diagnosis of schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, major depressive disorder 
with psychotic symptoms, organic mental syndromes; 
_ Active substance abuse or dependence during the 3 months prior to entry into the study;  
_ Ongoing psychotherapy,   
_ Cognitive impairment or dementia (Mini Mental State Exam score <26) or relevant neuro-
logical signs.  
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3.2.2 Cross-sectional Study Protocol 
Patients with a possible diagnosis of BPD and meeting the inclusion criteria were evaluated. 
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM disorder (I and II) (First et al., 1994; 1995) was admin-
istered to confirm the diagnoses of BPD and evaluate comorbidity. After this screening phase 
patients who accepted to participate to the study was included. Socio-demographical and clin-
ical information were collected by a specific form, investigating history of the disorder, sub-
stance abuse/dependency history, trauma, suicide attempts, self-harm, aggressions and previ-
ous treatments, both pharmacologic and non-pharmacologic (see fig. 6.7 in Appendix).  
Clinical evaluation included the primary outcomes measures on Metacognition Functions and 
secondary outcomes measures on the other clinical variables.  
 
3.2.3 Outcome Measure on Metacognition: 
    Total scores on MAI (Semerari, et al., 2008) were collected as the primary outcome meas-
ure after the inclusion in the study. MAI were administered by an independent assessor, 
trained directly by MAI’s authors on administration and scoring of the interview. 
 The MAI refers to the description of emotions and cognitions, and assesses how people 
are able to identify their own and others’ recurrent patterns of thinking, feeling and dealing 
with social problems (see Fig. 6.6 in Appendix) . The interview evaluates two main functional 
skill domains of metacognition, ‘the Self’ and ‘the Other’, each one composed of two dimen-
sions: Monitoring and Integration for the Self, Differentiation and Decentering for the Other. 
To identify the 16 basic facets of which the dimensions are composed (four facets for each 
dimension) the authors took into account the clinical literature that describes deficits in the 
ability to know and regulate mental states, theoretically based on the literature on mentaliza-
tion and attachment theories (Fonagy&Moran 1991; Fonagy&Target, 2006; Allen et al., 
2008), theory of mind (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Premack&Woodruff, 1978), metacognition 
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(Wellman, 1990; Wells, 2000) and, more generally, metarepresentation  (Frith, 1992; Sperber, 
2000).  
The Self domain comprises the ‘monitoring’ and ‘integrating’ dimensions and describes the 
way in which a person has explicit access to his own mental states (cognitive and emotional) 
in relation to behavior. 
 1. ‘Monitoring’ (MON) is referred to the ability to distinguish, recognize and define one’s 
own inner states (emotions and cognitions) and following behaviors during the ‘here and 
now’ of the described real-life episode.  
MON is composed of four facets:  
(a) the ability to recognize one’s own representations (thoughts and beliefs);  
(b) the ability to recognize and verbalize one’s own emotions;  
(c) the ability to establish relations among the separate components of a mental state; and  
(d) the ability to establish relations between the components of mental states and behavior.  
MON evaluates how a subject explains his/her own behavior in terms of causes and/or moti-
vations. If there is a deficit, he/she is unable to discern the reasons for his/ her behavior, and 
he/she cannot recognize or verbalize emotions or other mental states. Examples of questions 
stimulating MON are ‘What do you feel?’, ‘What do you think?’ and ‘What was your aim?’. 
 2. ‘Integrating’ (INT) is the second dimension of Self domain and involves the ability to 
produce coherent descriptions of people’s mental processes and states over time. INT refers to 
the ability to reflect on mental states and contents, putting them in a logical order and ranking 
them by relevance. Using INT abilities the subject is able to understand the link between 
his/her own mental states and different behaviors in different situations, decoding his/her 
mental, functional and dysfunctional habits and forming a consistent account of how his/her 
mental life has changed over his/her lifespan. 
INT includes four skills:  
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(a) the ability to describe understandable and coherent links among thoughts, events, actions 
and behaviors;  
(b) the ability to describe transitions among different mental states and explain the reasons 
why; 
(c) the ability to form generalized representations of his/her mental functioning, taking into 
account continuity over time of patterns of thinking and feeling;  
(d) the ability to reconstruct and describe to the interviewer one’s own mental functioning, 
providing enough information, without giving irrelevant and out-of-focus details, and giving a 
sense of order and coherence to the discourse. Examples of questions stimulating INT are ‘So, 
you have found yourself reacting by [the interviewer refers to the described behavior], and 
feelings [the interviewer refers to the mentioned emotion]. Does feeling/thinking and behav-
ing like this happen frequently to you?’ ‘You might also react in a different way, with differ-
ent emotions or thoughts, in circumstances like the one described. Can you remember a spe-
cific episode?’ 
Other metacognition domain comprises the ‘differentiating’ and the ‘decentering’ dimensions.  
 3. ‘Differentiating’ (DIF) concerns the ability to recognize the representational nature of 
one’s own and other individuals’ thoughts, the ability to differentiate between classes of rep-
resentations, such as imagination, evaluation and expectation, and to distinguish between rep-
resentation and reality. Using DIF abilities, the interviewee is able to consider his/her own 
opinion as a hypothesis and not as a matter of fact; DIF abilities allow one to consider repre-
sentations as mental phenomena, separate from but related to reality. Good DIF functioning 
makes people flexible in formulating opinions and points of view, and causes mental states to 
change depending on the communicative acts and on the availability of salient information.  
DIF comprises four skills:  
(a) the ability to consider one’s own representation of the world as subjective and questiona-
ble; 
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(b) the ability to give plausible interpretations of events;  
(c) the ability to reflect on and evaluate events (as opposed to a tendency to act impulsively);  
(d) the ability to distinguish between different modes of thoughts such as dreaming, fantasiz-
ing and imagining. Examples of questions stimulating DIF are ‘You said you have though that 
[the interview refers to the reported episode]. In that moment, how did you subjectively be-
lieve it and how did you consider other options?’ ‘Did you take into consideration alternative 
interpretations of the events?’ ‘During the episode how much did you feel confused or clear-
headed?’ Have you ever experienced such levels of confusion, or not been able to remember 
whether something really happened, or felt dreamy, unreal, like brain fog?’. 
 4. ‘Decentering’ (DEC) refers to the ability to infer others’ mental states in a plausible 
manner and adopt their perspective, recognizing that it is distinct from our own. DEC leads to 
the realization that other people’s behaviors are understandable on the basis of their own 
aims, beliefs, values and principles, which could be different from ours and independent of 
the relationship a person has with the subject. It involves the ability to describe others’ psy-
chology in a plausible, clear way, without using stereotypes or cliché. DEC also includes the 
ability to realize that basically we are not the center of others’ intentions and goals.  
DEC comprises four skills:  
(a) the ability to recognize, define and verbalize other people’s emotional inner state;  
(b) the ability to recognize, define and verbalize other people’s cognitive inner state;  
(c) the ability to establish relations among the separate components of others’ mental state; 
and  
(d) the ability to establish relations between the components of others’ mental state and their 
behavior.  
Examples of questions stimulating DEC are ‘How did you think the other person would react 
emotionally during the episode?’ ‘What did you think he/she thought?’ ‘Why did you think 
he/she thought that?’ and ‘What reasons did he/ she have?’. 
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 The MAI begins with the description of an autobiographical episode about the worst psy-
chological situation that he/she has experienced in the last six months. In order to evaluate the 
comprehension of others’ mental state, the episode has to include interaction with another 
person. MAI is focused on the worst episode of the last six months in order to be able to eval-
uate metacognitive function in critical circumstances with the prospect of applying it to clini-
cal populations. The MAI continues with four modules, each specific to the evaluation of one 
metacognitive dimension as described before. For each dimension of the metacognitive con-
struct, the interviewer has to ask a structured list of questions; the duration of MAI depends 
on the richness and how detailed the episode is been reported by the patient (Semerari et al., 
2008).  For each skill of each ability the score is measured on a likert scale from 1 to 5 (See 
Fig. 6.6 in Appendix) 
In particular authors provide these guidelines to assess the scoring:  
1. Insufficient ability. The subject can’t use the ability spontaneously, even with the help of 
the interviewer. The ability is rarely present during the interview, the description of the men-
tal state is  always unclear. Helps from the interviewers never help the subject to use correctly 
the ability.  
2. Partial ability. The ability is never used spontaneously, but the subject sometimes can use 
the ability partially with the help of the interviewer. The description of internal states is su-
perficial and never spontaneous, but with the helps of the interviewer there is some sporadic 
improvement in the use of the ability, only in some specific question of the interview. 
3. Moderate ability. Occasionally the subject can use the ability spontaneously and correct-
ly, but it happens rarely, despite of the helps from interviewer. Mental states is clearly de-
scripted, even if the descriptions are simple and not well-structured. Sometimes during the in-
terview the subject try to use spontaneously the ability, but his ability still depends on the in-
terviewer’s support.  
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4. Good ability. Often the subject uses spontaneously the ability, but rarely he still needs 
some support  from the interviewer. Mental states are clearly descripted. The subject can use 
the specific metacognition ability, but sometimes he would fail without the interviewer’s 
helps.  
5. Excellent ability: The subject succeeds in using the ability spontaneously and constantly, 
without any help. During the interview the subject can describe mental state, without fall in 
the use of the ability. The subject is able to refer to his mental state in a detailed and compre-
hensive way. The answers to the questions of the interview tend to go beyond the questions.  
  The MAI provided good inter-rater reliability, factorial validity and internal consistency 
(Semerari, et al, 2012).  
 
3.2.4 Other Clinical Outcome Measures:  
Patients were also assessed on the following clinical features:    
- Emotional dysregulation: it’ s a key feature of patients with borderline personality disorder 
(BPD; Gratz et al., 2006). Compared with healthy subjects, patients with BPD report more af-
fective instability, increased affect intensity and reactivity, and a rather negative affectivity 
(Rosenthal et al., 2008). Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS; Gratz & Roemer, 
2004) is the most used self-report questionnaire designed to assess emotion dysregulation and 
it’s based on 36-items. The measure yields a total score as well as scores on six scales: non-
acceptance of emotional responses, difficulties engaging in goal directed behaviour, impulse 
control difficulties, lack of emotional awareness, limited access to emotion regulation strate-
gies, and lack of emotional clarity. Emotion regulation is conceptualize as involving: a) 
awareness and understanding of emotions, b) acceptance of emotions, c) ability to control im-
pulsive behaviors and behave in accordance with desired goals, d) ability to use appropriate 
emotion regulation strategies flexibly to modulate emotional responses in order to meet indi-
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vidual goals and situational demands. The scale has high internal consistency, good test–retest 
reliability, and adequate construct and predictive validity. (Gratz&Roemer, 2004). 
- Alexithymia it’s a multifaceted personality construct defined as (a) a difficulty in identify-
ing feelings (DIF), (b) a difficulty in describing feelings (DDF), and (c) externally oriented 
thinking (EOT). Studies have reported an association between alexithymia and primitive and 
immature ego defense styles, which implies a relatively primitive way of dealing with emo-
tional problems (Parker, 1998). Manifestation of alexithymic features might be a transitory 
reaction evoked by stressful situations and accompanying depression and anxiety, which is 
called secondary alexithymia (Parker et al, 1991). The relationship between alexithymia and 
BPD suggests that difficulty identifying, differentiating, understanding, and communicating 
emotions and feelings impairs the ability to regulate their emotions in these patients 
(Webb&McMuran, 2008). In other studies alexithymia is described as another strategy that 
has been put forward as a coping mechanism to alleviate painful emotions (Elzinga BM, et al, 
2002) and so can be linked to difficulties in emotion regulation. The Toronto Alexithymia 
Scale (TAS-20, Bagby, et al, 1994) is the most used self-report scale to assess this concept 
and comprised of 20 items. Each item is rated on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree); five items are negatively keyed. The first factor (F1) 
in the three-factor model consists of seven items assessing the ability to identify feelings and 
to distinguish them from the somatic sensations that accompany emotional arousal. Factor 2 
(F2) consists of five items assessing the ability to describe feelings to other people and Factor 
3 (F3) consists of eight items assessing externally oriented thinking. In this study we used the 
total score to classify persons as having alexithimya (score>61), possibile Alexithymia (score 
between 52 and 60) and no alexithymia (score<51). Authors reported good factorial validity, 
concurrent validity and reliability for TAS (Bagby, et al., 1994). 
- Impulsiveness: it has been defined as a tendency for rapid and unplanned behaviors (Critch-
field, Levy, & Clarkin, 2004) and a tendency to act on urges without regard for the possible 
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consequences (Hochhausen, N. M., Lorenz, A. R., & Newman, 2002). These definitions point 
to the role of behavioral disinhibition in facilitating impulsive behaviors in BPD, and this has 
received empirical support (Rentrop et al., 2008). Impulsive behaviors in BPD have also been 
conceptualized as attempts to manage negative emotions (Brown, Comtois, & Linehan, 2002; 
Trull et al., 2000). In this way, impulsive behaviors are chosen to provide immediate distrac-
tion or relief from intense negative affects and it could be linked with the other clinical fea-
tures of BPD. Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS; Patton, et al, 1995) is a questionnaire de-
signed to assess the personality/behavioral construct of impulsiveness. The BIS-11 identifies 
three factors that express three different constructs of impulsivity: Motor impulsiveness, Im-
pulsivity without planning and Cognitive impulsivity. These scales have shown a good relia-
bility and validity with other measures of the same dimension and the total score of the BIS-
11 is an internally consistent measure of impulsiveness. 
- Depressive mood: Depression and BPD frequently coexist (Zanarini et al., 1998) and re-
search suggests that the presence of BPD in depression influences the course as well as 
treatment response in depression in negative ways (Stringer et al., 2013). Beck Depression 
Inventory (Beck, Steer, Garbin 1988) is a 21-question multiple-choice self-report inventory 
and it’s one of the most widely used instruments for measuring the severity of depression. 
Each response is assigned a score ranging from zero to three, indicating the severity of the 
symptom, the sum of each item provides a total score that correspond to a depression se-
verity level, from mild to severe.  
- Interpersonal Sensitivity: Interpersonal instability has been recognized as an essential fea-
ture of BPD, as reported in the diagnostic criteria (APA; 2000). This kind of instability 
seems due to the a specific vulnerability in BPD patients, for which they are more sensitive 
in the interpersonal relationship (Linnehan, 1993). Their interpersonal style is characterized 
by a paradoxical, seemingly contradictory combination of intense needs for closeness and 
attention with equally intense fears of rejection or abandonment. Given the obvious and ge-
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neric evolutionary value of needing others, it is the fearful or highly reactive component of 
this interpersonal style that is probably the more distinctive and pathogenic component 
(Gunderson&Lyons-Ruth, 2008). The Inventory of Interpersonal Problems (Pilkonis, et al., 
1996) it’s a 57 items self-report, assessing different aspects of interpersonal features (inter-
personal sensitivity, interpersonal ambivalence, aggression, need for social approval, and 
lack of sociability). Between this subscale the Interpersonal Sensitivity has been recognized 
as an essential feature of BPD (Trull, et al, 2001) that predispose subjects to over-react to 
other people’s comment.  
- General psychopathology: in order to obtain a general index of psychopathology the 
Symptoms Check-list 90 Revised (SCL-90, Derogatis, 1994) was used. It’s a psychiatric 
self-report inventory assessing the psychological symptom status and it has been used in 
numerous studies as a brief indicator of mental health (Preston et al. 2002). The 90 items in 
the questionnaire are scored on a five-point Likert scale, indicating the rate of occurrence of 
the symptom during the time reference. It is intended to measure symptoms intensity on 
nine different subscales and on a global indices that provide a means of communicating an 
individual’s pathology with a single number. This index is called Global Severity Index 
(GSI) and it’ s suggested to be a good single indicator of the current level of the disorder 
(Derogatis 2000). The SCL-90 has been used as a central outcome measure in numerous 
clinical trials, both psychopharmacological trials as well as in psychotherapy trials (Pani et 
al. 2000) and showed good psychometric qualities (Derogatis, 1994). 
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3.2.5 Statistical analyses  
  Descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation for continuous variables, frequency and 
percentage for categorical variables) were used to summarize demographics and clinical fea-
tures of the study sample. Parametric and non-parametric tests (Chi-square and Kruskal Wal-
lis test) were used to assess absence of differences in demographic and clinical variables 
among the three recruitment center. Rank correlation between scores of the primary and sec-
ondary outcomes was calculated with Spearman rho coefficients. 
Finally, a path analysis via Structural Equation Model was performed for analyzing the inter-
relations between principal outcome (MAI total score) and other variables resulted associat-
ed/correlated with it. The main advantage of using SEM is the flexibility to model complex 
relationships between one or more independent (exogenous) variables (MAI score, TAS 
score) and one or more dependent (endogenous) variables (BIS score, BDI scores, IIP score 
and GSI score) simultaneously (Bollen, 2014). The goodness of fit of the model, to test if the 
hypothesized model is a plausible explanatory model for the empirical data, was checked by 
several measures (Hancock GR, et al 201): χ2 test, relative χ2 test (less than 2.5 indicate a 
good fit) and comparative fit index (CFI -close to 1 for good fit-), root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA –less than 0.05 indicate a good fit-) and Tucker–Lewis coefficient 
(TLI - higher than 0.9 indicate a good fit). 
Missing data (less than 15%) of variables included in SEM were handled by stochastic regres-
sion imputation (Enders, 2010). Moreover, the presence of indirect mediator effect was evalu-
ated by Sobe, Aroian and Goodman tests (Preacher&Hayes, 2004). 
 All statistical analysis were carried out by using SPSS 21.0; SEM was implemented by pack-
age AMOS 21.0. Statistical significance was set at p<0.05. 
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3.3 Cross-Sectional study results  
    Seventy patients were assessed for the inclusion and 45 met the inclusion criteria. Twenty-
five patients were excluded from the study: n=20 for different principal diagnosis and n=5 pa-
tients refused to participate. In particular 12 in the Center 1, 8 in the Center 2 and 5 in the 
Center 3 were included (see Fig. 3.1). 
 
Figure 3. 1: Flow diagram of the sample selection.  
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Socio-demographic and clinical characteristics of the patients recruited were similar among 
sites (p of Anova and Kruskal-Wallis test larger than 0.05 for all variables) (see Tab. 3.2). 
 
Table 3.2 Comparison of socio-demographic and clinical characteristic of the three groups  
 Center 1  
N=28 
Mean (DS) 
Center 2 
N=11 
Mean (DS) 
Center  3 
N=6  
Mean (DS) 
ANOVA F 
statistic # 
p-value 
Age  34.5 (7.9) 27.6 (4.9) 36.9 (6.2) 3.163 0.053 
Education (years) 11.3 (3.1) 12.5 (2.5) 10.5 (2.7) 1.001 0.376 
Age at onset (years) 21.6 (7.9) 16.7 (3.6) 20.8 (7.6) 1.771 0.183 
Duration of illness 12.3 (7.5) 10.0 (5.5) 13.2 (8.7) 0.478 0.624 
Age at first contact 
with Psych Services 
24.8 (7.9) 21.2 (5.9) 23.0 (11.4) 0.807 0.453 
Number of DSM-IV 
BPD’s criteria (mean) 
6.5 (0.9) 7,0 (1.2) 6.7 (2.5) 0.663 0.521 
 
 
N (%) 
 
N (%) 
 
N (%) 
Chi 
Square 
test 
p-value 
Sex (%F) 20 (71.4%) 8 (72.7%) 4 (66.7%) 4.012 0.135 
Alcohol Abu-
se/Addiction lifetime 
15 (53.6%) 6 (60.0%) 4 (66.7%) 0.819 0.399 
Substance Abu-
se/Addiction lifetime 
14 (50.0%) 5 (50.0%) 4 (66.7%) 0.329 0.848 
Attenpted suicide 17 (60.7%) 4 (40.0%) 1 (16.7%) 4.352 0.113 
Self-harm 9 (64.3%) 10 (62.5%) 7 (46.7%) 3.999 0.819 
At least one relative 
with psych. disorder  
25 (92.6%) 8 (80.0%) 3 (60.0%) 4.010 0.135 
# Considering the groups sample size, differences among groups were evaluated also with non-
parametric Kruskal-Wallis test, obtaining consistent results with respect to ANOVA test.   
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Tables 3.3 shows comparisons on principal and secondary outcomes between the groups. All 
the variables, both the total and subscale scores, resulted not statistically different so we can 
consider all the subjects as a whole sample (p-value larger than 0.05 for all variables). 
  
Table 3.3 Comparison of primary and secondary outcomes of the three groups  
  Center 1  
N=28 
Mean (DS) 
Center 2 
N=11 
Mean (DS) 
Center  3 
N=6  
Mean (DS) 
F # p-value 
MAI Total Score 41.6 (5.5) 40.6 (8.2) 45.8 (6.1) 1.168 0.322 
Sub-scale Monitoring 10.9 (2.3) 11.0 (2.3) 12.0(1.7) 0.473 0.627 
Differentiation 10.3 (1.3) 9.8 (1.9) 11.0 (1.4) 1.071 0.353 
Integration 10.3 (1.4) 9.7 (2.4) 11.6 (0.9) 2.105 0.136 
Decentering 10.0 (1.4) 10.1 (2.0) 11.2 (2.4) 0.940 0.400 
TAS  Total Score 52.9 (15.1) 51.7 (15.5) 55.5 (14.7) 0.078 0.925 
DERS  Total Score 119.1 (19.1) 115.0 (23.0) 108.5 (36.6) 0.433 0.653 
BIS  Total Score 76.7 (10.5) 78.8 (16.7) 72.8 (15.3) 0.472 0.628 
SCL 90  GSI (Global 
Severity Index) 
1.3 (0.7) 2.0 (0.6) 2.0 (0.8) 3.171 0.066 
IIP  Interpersonal 
Sensitivity 
2.0 (0.8) 1.8 (1.0) 1.8 (1.0) 0.205 0.816 
BDI Total Score 26.2 (11.6) 26.3 (13.4) 25.5 (14.1) 0.006 0.995 
# Considering the groups sample size, differences among groups were evaluated also with 
non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test, obtaining consistent results with respect to ANOVA test.   
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3.3.1 Demographical and clinical characteristic of the sample 
Demographical data of the whole sample (N=45) are shown in Tables 3.4 and 3.5.  Mean age 
was 32 years and the mean age at onset was 20 years, so the mean duration of illness was 
around 12 years. The age at first contact was 24, so the gap between the beginning of symp-
toms and the first contact to psychiatric services was around 3 years.  
 
Table 3.4 Socio-demographic and clinical characteristic of the sample 
 Cross-Sectional Study’s Sample  
N=45 
 Mean  SD Range 
Age  32.6  8.0 18-45 
Education (years) 11.4  3.0 8-19 
Age at onset (years) 20.4  7.2 10-44 
Duration of illness (years) 11.8  7.1 1-30 
Age at first contact with Psych 
Services 
23.8  7.9 12-44 
Number of DSM-IV BPD’s crite-
ria  
6.6  1.1 5-9 
 
 
 
The female in the sample was the majority and more than an half of the patients was unem-
ployed (Table 3.5). The presence of SUD, Substance Use Disorder, was around 50%, and a 
similar percentage of the patients attempted suicide lifetime. Finally almost the 60% experi-
enced self-harming behavior and the most common Axis I comorbidity was depression and 
anxiety disorders. Finally the 85% of the family of the patients had at last one familiar with 
psychiatric disorders. 
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Table 3.5 Socio-demographic and clinical characteristic of the sample 
 N Percentage 
Sex (F) 32  71.1% 
Occupation 
       unemployed 
       employed 
       other (student/housewife) 
 
23 
13 
9 
 
52.3% 
29.5% 
18,2% 
Alcohol Abuse/Addiction (lifetime) 25  55.6% 
Substance Abuse/Addiction  
(lifetime) 
23  51.1% 
Attempted suicide (lifetime) 22  48.9% 
Self-harm (lifetime) 26  57.8% 
At least one relative with psych. 
disorder  
39 85.7% 
Axis I comorbidities (lifetime) 
Depression  
Anxiety Disorders 
 
22 
17 
 
48.9% 
37.8% 
 
 
 
 
 
The metacognition functions (see Table 3.6), measured by Total score on MAI, corresponded 
to a moderate deficit in metacognition. The mean score in sub-scale “monitoring” was higher 
than in the other subscales, indicating a better ability to recognize emotions than to manage 
them. The medium level of this sub-scale correspond to “moderate ability”, while the other 
functions was in “partial ability” range. The medium score on DERS was 2DS over the mean 
score of the sample validation of the scale. The TAS Total score indicate the presence of 
“Alexithymia” in a quarter of the sample and “possible Alexithymia” in another quarter, refer-
ring to the cut-off given by author (Bagby, et al, 1994). The sample was characterized by a 
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high level of impulsivity, as indicate by BIS total score and the level of depression, measured 
by BDI mean score, revealed a score in the range of  “moderate depression”. 
 
Table 3.6 Primary and secondary outcomes of the sample 
  Cross-Sectional Study’s Sample  
N=45 
  Mean  SD Range 
MAI Total Score 41.8 6.4 32-54 
Sub-scale Monitoring 11.1 2.2 8-17 
Differentiation 10,2 1,5 7-13 
Integration 10.3 1.7 6-13 
Decentering 10.2 1.7 7-14 
DERS  Total Score 117.2 21.7 73-154 
BIS  Total Score 74.5 12,1 52-109 
SCL 90  GSI (Global Severity In-
dex) 
2.1 0.7 0.5-3.3 
IIP  Interpersonal Sensitivity 1.9 0.8 0-3 
BDI Total Score 26.1 11.8 0-50 
TAS  Total Score 22 (48.9%) No Alexithymia 
12 (26.7%) Possible Alexithymia 
11 (24.4) Alexithymia 
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3.3.2 Correlation between clinical variables  
Correlations between the principal and secondary outcomes are shown in Table 3.7. MAI To-
tal score showed a negative correlation only with TAS Total score. The major part of the sec-
ondary outcome measures resulted correlated. In particular DERS Total scores was associated 
with all the other measures and TAS score with all, except IIP Interpersonal Sensitivity score. 
GSI score didn’t correlate to BIS and IIP scores.  
 
Table 3.7  Correlation Matrix on primary and secondary outcomes. *=p<0.05; **=p<0.01 
 
 TAS 
Total 
Score 
DERS 
Total 
Score 
BIS Total 
Score 
SCL-90  
Global 
Severity 
Index 
IIP  
Inter-
personal 
Sensitiv-
ity 
BDI 
MAI 
Total Score 
-.415* 
.031 
-.291 
.100 
-.311 
.083 
-0.011 
0.952 
-.154 
.393 
-.113 
.567 
TAS Total Score 1 -.599** 
.002 
.479** 
.009 
0.460* 
0.014 
.262 
.170 
.414* 
.026 
DERS Total Score  1 .613** 
.000 
0.384* 
0.027 
.759** 
.000 
.529** 
.003 
BIS Total Score   1 0.284 
0.109 
.536** 
.001 
.281 
.133 
SCL 90 Global 
Severity Index 
   1 .348* 
.044 
.659** 
.000 
IIP Interpersonal 
Sensitivity 
    1 .618** 
.000 
BDI      1 
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3.3.3 Structural Equation Model  
    All variables significantly associated to the main outcome (MAI Total score) and DERS 
Total score were included in SEM. Although MAI Total score and DERS Total score weren’t 
correlated directly, we tested the hypothesis to evaluate the indirect relation of  TAS Total 
Score as a mediator of the relation between MAI and DERS. Finally, we evaluated the rela-
tionship between DERS, as predictor, and symptomatic scale, BIS, SCL-90, BDI and IIP.   
The final model is displayed in Figure 3.8 in the next page. The number of estimated parame-
ters was 35, including covariance parameters between exogenous variables for improving the 
model fit. Model fit indices showed a good fit of the model to the data (χ² = 18.82, df= 13, 
p=0.129, relative χ²= 1.45, CFI= 0.95, TLI = 0.92, RSMEA= 0.1 [90%CI 0.000-0.147]). 
TAS resulted a mediator between MAI total score and DERS score (Sobel, Aroian and 
Goodman p-values were 0.012,0.013,0.011 respectively) 
Finally, DERS significantly predicted the clinical variables, BIS Total score (beta standard-
ized regression coefficient= 0.58, p<0.001);  BDI total score (beta=0.61, p<0.001); Interper-
sonal sensitivity score, a sub-scale of IIP (beta= 0.60, p<0.001); GSI, Global Severity Index 
of SCL-90 (beta=0.32, p=0.023). 
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Figure 3.8. Structural Equation Model: standardized estimates. In black dotted line the 
correlation (standardized covariance) parameters between variables are depicted. The 
number of different parameters to be estimated was 35, including covariance parameters 
for improving the model fit.      *=p<.05, **=p<.001 
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3.4 Discussion of the cross-sectional study 
 
    The present study shows that metacognition and emotion regulation deficits play a central 
role in the conceptualization on BPD. Since 1980, till some years ago, BPD was unequivocal-
ly reported as more common in women than men (APA, 2004), but a recent and well-
executed study by Grant et al. (2011) found that BPD is equally prevalent among men and 
women. Nonetheless samples of BPD studies continues to show a disproportion between gen-
der (Sansone&Sansone, 2011). The reasons of these bias could be found in the traditional set-
tings for studies, i.e., psychiatric settings, that may not reflect the true gender distribution of 
BPD, in which women with BPD are more likely to be over-represented, instead of men with 
BPD that are more likely to be over-represented in substance-abuse treatment programs 
(Goodman, 2010). Probably for the same reason, also in our sample females were the majori-
ty, and the setting of recruiting could have influenced also the duration of the illness, that re-
sults similar to studies included in a metanalysis on this topic (Stoffers et al, 2012). In fact, 
symptoms of BPD usually begin in late adolescence (Chanen, et al., 2004; Miller, et al., 
2007), even though treatment typically begins in early adulthood (Zanarini, et al., 2001)  and 
often BPD patients present for evaluation or treatment with one or more comorbid axis I dis-
orders. Initially, these symptomatic disorders may mask the underlying borderline psycho-
pathology, impeding accurate diagnosis and making treatment planning difficult (Zanarini, 
1998). In our sample the 50% of the sample had suffered of a Depressive Episode and 40% of 
an Anxiety Disorder lifetime, in line with the percentage reported by other studies in which 
Mood and Anxiety Disorders remains the most common lifetime Axis I comorbidity disorders 
in BPD (Zanarini et al., 1989, Marino&Zanarini, 2001, Zanarini et al., 2014). Even the alco-
hol or substance abuse/dependence resulted frequent in our sample, around 50%, as reported 
also in cross-sectional studies in which 23.8–66% of borderline patients report meeting crite-
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ria for alcohol abuse or dependence and 19–87% report meeting criteria for drug abuse or de-
pendence (McGlashan et al., 2000).  
    Beyond the comorbidities that get more difficult the treatment of the disorder, also the 
presence of attempted suicide and self-harm had contributed historically to earn the reputation 
to be one of the hardest psychiatric disorder to manage. In our sample the prevalence of the 
attempted suicide or self-harm is around 60% lifetime and usually this behavior is the dys-
functional way that patients found to manage negative emotions, as shown in cross-sectional 
studies reporting that self-mutilation help to gain relief from negative emotions (Hul-
bert&Thomas, 2010).  
Factors pertaining to traumatic experiences throughout the lifespan are associated with self-
mutilation over time (Zanarini et al., 2011), and also our sample reported violence, abuse or 
an invalidating family environments during childhood in the 70% of cases. A key role is in 
fact played by the family, cause it could represent both a genetic and environmental risk fac-
tor for the disorder with a heightened prevalence of psychiatric disorders in the first-degree 
relatives of borderline patients (Zanarini, et al., 2004), as reported in our sample too. Difficul-
ties in familiar environmental, in adjunction to an individual vulnerability, could be consid-
ered also the principal obstacle to develop a secure attachment with parents and consequently 
to develop good mentalization abilities. Fonagy emphasized a developmental model, contex-
tualizing the formation of mentalization in the setting of secure early attachment relationships 
(Fonagy, 1991). More specifically, the author argued that the primary caretaker’s marked and 
contingent mirroring of a child’s internal states within a secure attachment facilitates the 
child’s development of a capacity to mentalize (Choi-Kain&Gunderson, 2008). Problematic 
family context, trauma, and even innate biological factors may cause a dysfunction and hy-
persensitivity in the stress-response system, leading to a cascade of hyperarousal, affective 
dysregulation, and inhibition of the orbitofrontal cortex, a brain region associated with men-
talizing activity (Fonagy&Bateman, 2007). In this conceptualization BPD is formulated as a 
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syndrome organized around an unstable capacity for mentalization. Similarly, in Semerari et 
al. (2014) theory, metacognitive dysfunctions is characteristic of personality disorder and in 
particular BPD patients show lower score in two metacognitive area: differentiating and inte-
gration (Semerari et al, 2015), as reported in our sample too. Studies focused on “mind read-
ing”, that is the ability to recognize and name emotions (Gullestad et al., 2013; Mc Main et al, 
2013) or, vice versa, on the ability to interpret other people’s mental states by reading facial 
expressions, instead show contrasting results (Semerari, et al, 2015). Some studies on alexi-
thymia, which is defined as the difficulty to recognize and label our own emotions (Bagby et 
al., 1994), show that this was a characteristic difficulty of patients with BPD (McMain et al., 
2013), whereas in other studies alexithymia is observed in a sub-sample of patients, mostly 
suffering from avoidant, dependent, passive–aggressive and depressive PD, and less frequent-
ly in patients with BPD traits (Nicolò et al., 2011). In our sample the distribution of the total 
score on TAS is perfectly assailable to what found in this study, (Nicolò et al., 2011) and in 
particular an half of the sample didn’t not show Alexithymia, while the other half of the sam-
ple is equally divided between a quarter in the range of “possible Alexithymia” and the other 
quarter over the cut off, indicating the presence of Alexithymia. The construct of Alexi-
thymia, as mentioned before, is referred to the difficulty in recognizing and naming emotions, 
and partially overlap with the concept of Monitoring, measured by the first sub-score of MAI. 
In our sample Monitoring score is higher than the score on the other Metacognition sub-
functions, according to the literature in which BPD patients showed less severe deficits on 
this  skill (Semerari, et al, 2015). These results are also consistent with several clinical obser-
vations (Bateman and Fonagy, 2004).  The impairments in other metacognitive sub-functions  
instead was linked to the BPD conceptualization itself. Difficulties of these patients to distin-
guish between reality and mental representation, called Differentiation in Semerari’s model, 
resulted impaired in several previous studies, both in MIT field and MBT’s one (Semerari et 
al., 2005, 2014; Bateman and Fonagy, 2006). Poor differentation implies that subjects per-
 49 
ceived their representation as objective, not an hypothetical scenario, but as concrete facts 
calling for reactions, and this could play a role in generating their behavioral dyscontrol. The 
other sub-function “typically impaired” in these patients is Integration that reflect their diffi-
culties to integrate different emotions and thoughts and can contribute to their difficulties to 
form a stable self-imagine and a stable representation of other people (Semerari et al., 2015). 
Finally difficulties in Decentering could be comparable to the lack of cognitive empathy ob-
served in other studies (New et al, 2012; Hengartner, et al, 2014).  
In our sample the score on TAS (Toronto Alexithymia Scale) was associated with the 
metacognitive functions but also with the inability to regulate emotions, measured by DERS 
Total score, and in particular the score on TAS seemed to mediate between MAI and DERS 
scores. Alexithymia is a construct which includes different facets, namely difficulties 
identifying feelings and distinguishing them from somatic sensations; difficulties describing 
feelings to others; constricted imaginal processes; and a concrete, externally oriented style of 
thinking (Bagby et al., 1994). The construct of alexithymia has been linked to heightened 
levels of psychiatric symptoms (Parker et al., 2008), to poor regulation of impulses (Fossati et 
al., 2009) and interpersonal dysfunctions (Vanheule, et al, 2007), all typical signs of 
Personality Disorder. Therefore it could be hypothesized that alexithymia is a typical 
construct of many personality disorders (Nicolò et al, 2011), and it could be reflect a failure to 
adequately develop purely mental constructs to process and modulate emotions (Joyce et al., 
2013). In our sample the TAS score was associated to DERS score, so we can suppose that 
the difficulties in emotion regulation is linked to the construct of alexithymia. Although there 
is no consensus on the definition, emotion dysregulation could be considered as a deficit in 
the ability to modulate the experience and expression of emotions and to maintain goal di-
rected behavior in the presence of intense negative affect (Gratz et al., 2006).  Many criteria 
for BPD in the DSM-IV reflect abnormalities in emotional functioning, and emotion dysregu-
lation is hypothesized to play a central role in the etiology and development of BPD (Put-
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nam&Silk, 2005; McLaughlin et al., 2011), giving rise to affective instability as well as other 
symptoms of the disorder such as identity disturbance, interpersonal dysfunction, and self-
harm (Gleen&Klonsky 2009).  
Moreover emotion dysregulation (ED) may sustain BPD symptoms and associated problemat-
ic behaviors, which is consistent with several studies illustrating a link between ED and be-
havior (Selby&Joiner, 2012). The transaction between an individual’s innate biological dispo-
sition toward an emotional over-reaction and an invalidating environment leads to deficit in 
skill to regulate intense emotions (Adrian, et al., 2011). At the same time these deficits to 
cope with and modulate affect contribute to even more intense and variable affects, maintain-
ing this features over time (Selby et al., 2009). In an interesting study by Steep et al. (2014) 
they showed that the overall level of emotion dysregulation difficulties mediate the associa-
tion between BPD symptoms and BPD features at 1-year follow-up, demonstrating that ED 
was a maintance mechanism for BPD symptoms. In our study ED was associated to general 
symptomatology, measured by GSI (General Severity Index of SCL-90 scale, Derogatis, 
1994), impulsivity (BIS score), level of depression (BDI score) and interpersonal sensitivity 
(IIP Interpersonal Sensitivity score). Studies on BPD suggest that ED exhibits a robust and 
unique relationship with symptomatology (Glenn et al., 2009), measured either by self-report 
or semistructured interview. The inability to regulate emotion when experiencing heightened 
emotional arousal, both negative and positive, lead to the tendency to act impulsively (Jacob 
et al., 2010), that may serve to reduce negative affect (Traggeser&Robinson, 2009). In addi-
tion emotion dysregulation and some dimensions of impulsivity are robustly related to BPD 
features (Fossati et al., 2014) and to their interpersonal problems (Werner, et al., 2010). Our 
findings support the idea that the inability to manage emotion is an important contributor to 
BPD, as reported by Carpenter and Trull (2013) and by other studies, even if these are only 
preliminary results that have to be examined more in depth and replicated in a larger sample.  
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3.5 Strengths and limitations  
This study has both strengths and limitations. It’s the first study using a SEM Model to link 
together Metacognition, Emotion Dysregulation and symptoms of BPD. The principal limita-
tion of this study is due to the use of self-report to test psychopathology, and clinical rating 
only for assessing Metacognition functions. The other main limitation is due to the small 
sample size that can affect the generalization of our results. However these results can con-
tribute to an area in which empirical findings are still scarce and inconsistent 
(Gulestad&Wilberg, 2011). 
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Chapter 4: 
LONGITUDINAL STUDY 
 
4.1 Introduction to the longitudinal study and aims 
    Most patients with BPD are treated with non-specialist standard psychiatric services, in-
cluding inpatient treatment, partial hospitalization, and outpatient services as necessary 
(Bateman and Fonagy, 2006). However, specific psychological interventions have been de-
veloped and actually structured psychotherapy is the “gold standard” treatment for this disor-
der (Stoffers et al, 2012), because the dysfunctional characteristics of the disorder cannot 
change with pharmacotherapy. Efficacy studies demonstrated that different psychotherapy 
approaches improve specific target of the disorder and actually the supported psychosocial 
treatments for BPD are dialectical behavior therapy (DBT) (Linneahn, 1993), mentalization-
based psychotherapy (MBT) (Bateman&Fonagy, 2006) transference-focused psychotherapy 
(TFP), schema-focused psychotherapy (SFT) (Clarkin et al, 2006), general psychiatric man-
agement (GPM) (Links et al., 2010), and systems training for emotional predictability and 
problem solving (STEPPS) (Young et al, 2003). All these therapies share non-specific thera-
peutic aspects, but they differ in other aspects that can improve specific features of the disor-
der, as demonstrated by their specific RCT outcomes. On these premises, it could be speculat-
ed that in the future treatments may be tailored to specific clinical constellations presented by 
BPD patients (Gabbard, 2007), but far more research is needed to test this hypothesis.  
So far only few studies are present in literature that compare different approaches for BPD 
and regarding outcomes as number of admission, suicide attempts and other unspecific clini-
cal features. This is  mainly due to the difficulty to find a single outcome for such a complex 
disorder. All the study on depression, for example, obviously has the same measurable out-
come, the level of depression, but for Personality Disorder it’s difficult to find a specific out-
come. Although a comprehensive model has not yet been formulated, in the last years litera-
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ture focused on scarce mentalization abilities and difficulties in emotion regulation, as core 
features of BPD (Sharp, Pane, Ha, et al. 2011).  So with the aim to evaluate how these dimen-
sions change during psychotherapeutic treatment we choose to compare the two specific ap-
proaches explicitly focused on metacognition/mentalization, Mentalization Based Treatment 
(MBT, Bateman&Fonagy, 2004) and the Metacognitive Interpersonal Therapy (MIT). The 
study addresses the following questions: do metacognitive abilities improve after 1 year of 
MIT/MBT vs TAU? And do MIT and MBT influence metacognition abilities in a different 
way?  
Finally we investigate if emotion dysregulation, and other clinical variables, such as impul-
sivity,  alexithymia, depressed mood, interpersonal sensitivity, and the general level of psy-
chopathology change in 1 year therapy and if changes in these variables are associate with 
changes in Metacognitive functions. 
 
 
4.2 Methods  
4.2.1 study population 
BPD patients were recruited in 3 different psychiatric clinic: the hospital IRCCS San Giovan-
ni di Dio, located in Brescia, the Mental Health Service of Savona and the CIRDIP, located in 
Pavia. The first one is a clinical and research center dedicated to the mental health, the second 
one is a community mental health service and the last one is an outpatient service, specialized 
in personality disorder treatment. Clinical approaches to personality disorders of these ser-
vices are different and one of the aims of the study is to compare the outcomes of their ap-
proaches.   
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Inclusion criteria were:  
_ Meet DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) criteria for BPD;  
_ Age at baseline between 18 and 45 years;  
_ Able to provide informed consent.  
Exclusion criteria were: 
_ Lifetime diagnosis of schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, major depressive disorder 
with psychotic symptoms, organic mental syndromes; 
_ Active substance abuse or dependence during the 3 months prior to entry into the study; 
_ Ongoing psychotherapy, 
_ Cognitive impairment (Mini Mental State Exam score <26) or relevant neurological signs.  
4.2.2 Protocol and design of the study  
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM disorder (I and II) (First et al., 1994; 1995) was admin-
istered to confirm the diagnoses of BPD and evaluate comorbidities. At baseline socio-
demographical and clinical information were collected by a specific form, investigating histo-
ry of the illness, substance abuse/dependency history, trauma, suicide attempts, self-harm, ag-
gressions and previous treatments, both pharmacologic and non-pharmacologic ones (see Fig. 
6.7). After 12 months these information were updated, in particular number and length of 
hospitalizations, suicide attempts, substance abuse, self-harm and aggressions were investi-
gated. Primary outcome interview and the other self-report scales too were administered at 
baseline and after 12months.  
Patients were divided into 3 different groups: 
1. BPD patients treated with Metacognitive Interpersonal Therapy (Dimaggio&Semerari, 
2006);  
2. BPD patients treated with Mentalization Based Therapy (Bateman&Fonagy, 2006); 
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3. BPD patients treated as usual (TAU): general psychiatric care, but no specialist psycho-
therapy.  
Patients were classified as having completed treatment if the time between the first and last 
sessions was at least 12 months. Patients who missed four consecutive sessions, with no as-
certained reasons to justify this, were considered as dropouts.  
4.2.3 Treatment and Therapist 
   Patients were treated by two kinds of active interventions: MIT (Dimaggio, et al., 2007) and 
MBT (Bateman&Fonagy, 2006); or belong to a control group (TAU). Unfortunately the sam-
ple couldn’t be randomized because we couldn’t find a center provided both MIT and MBT 
treatments. 
- MIT consisted of a 50-minute weekly individual session. MIT is designed to achieve a hier-
archy of goals: (a) assessment of problematic mental states and interpersonal processes; (b) 
management of maladaptive behaviors, (c) intervention on symptoms that cause emotional 
distress; (d) to increase the ability (integration) to construct an integrated representation of 
self and others; (e) to increase the ability to recognize her/his role in interpersonal processes 
and to promote more adaptive behaviors (Dimaggio, et al., 2007).  
- MBT consisted of a 50-minute weekly individual session. The principal aim of MBT ap-
proach is to improve mentalization, activating the attachment system through the discussion 
of current attachment relationship, past ones and regulating the patient’s attachment bond to 
therapist (Bateman&Fonagy, 2006). 
- TAU (Treatment as usual) consisted of general psychiatric care with medication prescribed 
by the consultant psychiatrist, and periods of partial hospital and inpatient treatment as neces-
sary but no specialist psychotherapy.  
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Psychotherapies were delivered by “expert therapists”, with a minimum of 2 years of clinical 
experience and a minimum of 1 year of experience treating BPD patients (as defined in 
McMain 2009). Six psychotherapists were involved, three for each treatment (MIT and 
MBT). Pharmacotherapy in all groups used a symptom-targeted approach as suggested in the 
APA guidelines (APA, 2001). See Fig. 6.3-6.4-6.5 in Appendix. 
4.2.4 Primary outcome measures on metacognition 
   Total scores on Metacognition Assessment Interview (MAI, Semerari, et al., 2012) were 
collected as the primary outcome measure at baseline and after 12 months. MAI were admin-
istered by an independent assessor, not involved in the psychotherapeutic treatment and 
trained directly by MAI’s authors on administration and scoring of the interview. 
   The MAI refers to the description of emotions and cognitions, and assesses how people are 
able to identify their own and others’ recurrent patterns of thinking, feeling and dealing with 
social problems (see Fig.6.6). The interview evaluates two main functional skill domains of 
metacognition, ‘the Self’ and ‘the Other’, each one composed of two dimensions: Monitoring 
and Integration for the Self, Differentiation and Decentering for the Other. To identify the 16 
basic facets of which the dimensions are composed (four facets for each dimension) the au-
thors took into account the clinical literature that describes deficits in the ability to know and 
regulate mental states, theoretically based on the literature on mentalization and attachment 
theories (Fonagy&Moran 1991; Fonagy&Target, 2006; Allen et al., 2008), theory of mind 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Premack&Woodruff, 1978), metacognition (Wellman, 1990; 
Wells, 2000) and, more generally, meta- representation  (Frith, 1992; Sperber, 2000).  
The Self domain comprises the ‘monitoring’ and ‘integrating’ dimensions and describes the 
way in which a person has explicit access to his own mental states (cognitive and emotional) 
in relation to behavior. 
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 1. ‘Monitoring’ (MON) is referred to as the ability to distinguish, recognize and define 
one’s own inner states (emotions and cognitions) and following behaviors during the ‘here 
and now’ of the described real-life episode.  
MON is composed of four facets:  
(a) the ability to recognize one’s own representations (thoughts and beliefs);  
(b) the ability to recognize and verbalize one’s own emotions;  
(c) the ability to establish relations among the separate components of a mental state; and  
(d) the ability to establish relations between the components of mental states and behavior.  
MON evaluates how a subject explains his/her own behavior in terms of causes and/or moti-
vations. If there is a deficit, he/she is unable to discern the reasons for his/ her behavior, and 
he/she cannot recognize or verbalize emotions or other mental states. Examples of questions 
stimulating MON are ‘What do you feel?’, ‘What do you think?’ and ‘What was your aim?’. 
 2. ‘Integrating’ (INT) is the second dimension of Self domain and involves the ability to 
produce coherent descriptions of people’s mental processes and states over time. INT refers to 
the ability to reflect on mental states and contents, putting them in a logical order and ranking 
them by relevance. Using INT abilities the subject is able to understand the link between 
his/her own mental states and different behaviors in different situations, decoding his/her 
mental, functional and dysfunctional habits and forming a consistent account of how his/her 
mental life has changed over his/her lifespan. 
INT comprises four skills:  
(a) the ability to describe understandable and coherent links among thoughts, events, actions 
and behaviors;  
(b) the ability to describe transitions among different mental states and explain the reasons 
why; 
(c) the ability to form generalized representations of his/her mental functioning, taking into 
account continuity over time of patterns of thinking and feeling;  
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(d) the ability to reconstruct and describe to the interviewer one’s own mental functioning, 
providing enough information, without giving irrelevant and out-of-focus details, and giving a 
sense of order and coherence to the discourse. Examples of questions stimulating INT are ‘So, 
you have found yourself reacting by [the interviewer refers to the described behavior], and 
feelings [the interviewer refers to the mentioned emotion]. Does feeling/thinking and behav-
ing like this happen frequently to you?’ ‘You might also react in a different way, with differ-
ent emotions or thoughts, in circumstances like the one described. Can you remember a spe-
cific episode?’ 
Other metacognition domain comprises the ‘differentiating’ and the ‘decentering’ dimensions.  
 3. ‘Differentiating’ (DIF) concerns the ability to recognize the representational nature of 
one’s own and other individuals’ thoughts, the ability to differentiate between classes of rep-
resentations, such as imagination, evaluation and expectation, and to distinguish between rep-
resentation and reality. Using DIF abilities, the interviewee is able to consider his/her own 
opinion as a hypothesis and not as a matter of fact; DIF abilities allow one to consider repre-
sentations as mental phenomena, separate from but related to reality. Good DIF functioning 
makes people flexible in formulating opinions and points of view, and causes mental states to 
change depending on the communicative acts and on the availability of salient information.  
DIF comprises four skills:  
(a) the ability to consider one’s own representation of the world as subjective and questiona-
ble; 
(b) the ability to give plausible interpretations of events;  
(c) the ability to reflect on and evaluate events (as opposed to a tendency to act impulsively);  
(d) the ability to distinguish between different modes of thoughts such as dreaming, fantasiz-
ing and imagining. Examples of questions stimulating DIF are ‘You said you have though that 
[the interview refers to the reported episode]. In that moment, how did you subjectively be-
lieve it and how did you consider other options?’ ‘Did you take into consideration alternative 
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interpretations of the events?’ ‘During the episode how much did you feel confused or clear-
headed?’ Have you ever experienced such levels of confusion, or not been able to remember 
whether something really happened, or felt dreamy, unreal, like brain fog?’. 
 4. ‘Decentering’ (DEC) refers to the ability to infer others’ mental states in a plausible 
manner and adopt their perspective, recognizing that it is distinct from our own. DEC leads to 
the realization that other people’s behaviors are understandable on the basis of their own 
aims, beliefs, values and principles, which could be different from ours and independent of 
the relationship a person has with the subject. It involves the ability to describe others’ psy-
chology in a plausible, clear way, without using stereotypes or cliché. DEC also includes the 
ability to realize that basically we are not the center of others’ intentions and goals.  
DEC includes four skills:  
(a) the ability to recognize, define and verbalize other people’s emotional inner state;  
(b) the ability to recognize, define and verbalize other people’s cognitive inner state;  
(c) the ability to establish relations among the separate components of others’ mental state; 
and  
(d) the ability to establish relations between the components of others’ mental state and their 
behavior.  
Examples of questions stimulating DEC are ‘How did you think the other person would react 
emotionally during the episode?’ ‘What did you think he/she thought?’ ‘Why did you think 
he/she thought that?’ and ‘What reasons did he/ she have?’. 
 The MAI begins with the description of an autobiographical episode about the worst psy-
chological situation that he/she has experienced in the last six months. In order to evaluate the 
comprehension of others’ mental state, the episode has to include interaction with another 
person. MAI is focused on the worst episode of the last six months in order to be able to eval-
uate metacognitive function in critical circumstances with the prospect of applying it to clini-
cal populations. The MAI continues with four modules, each specific to the evaluation of one 
 60 
metacognitive dimension as described before. For each dimension of the metacognitive con-
struct, the interviewer has to ask a structured list of questions; the duration of MAI depends 
on the richness and how detailed the episode is been reported by the patient (Semerari et al., 
2008).  For each skill of each ability the score is measured on a likert scale from 1 to 5 (see 
Fig.6.6 in Appendix). 
In particular authors provide these guidelines to assess the scoring:  
1. Insufficient ability. The subject can’t use the ability spontaneously, even with the help of 
the interviewer. The ability is rarely present during the interview, the description of the men-
tal state is  always unclear. Helps from the interviewers never help the subject to use correctly 
the ability.  
2. Partial ability. The ability is never used spontaneously, but the subject sometimes can use 
the ability partially with the help of the interviewer. The description of internal states is su-
perficial and never spontaneous, but with the helps from the interviewer there is some sporad-
ic improvement in the use of the ability, only in some specific question of the interview. 
3. Moderate ability. Occasionally the subject can use the ability spontaneously and correct-
ly, but it happens rarely, despite of the helps from interviewer. Mental states is clearly de-
scripted, even if   the descriptions are simple and not well-structured. Sometimes during the 
interview the subject try to use spontaneously the ability, but his ability still depends on the 
interviewer’s support.  
4. Good ability. Often the subject uses spontaneously the ability, but rarely he still needs 
some support  from the interviewer. Mental states are clearly descripted. The subject can use 
the specific metacognition ability, but sometimes he would fail without the interviewer’s 
helps.  
5. Excellent ability: The subject succeeds in using the ability spontaneously and constantly, 
without any help. During the interview the subject can describe mental state, without fall in 
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the use of the ability. The subject is able to refer to his mental state in a detailed and compre-
hensive way. The answers to the questions of the interview tend to go beyond the questions.  
  The MAI provided good inter-rater reliability, factorial validity and internal consistency 
(Semerari, et al, 2012).  
 
4.2.5 Secondary outcome measures 
Patients were also assessed by the following self-report questionnaire, administered at base-
line and after 1 year: 
- Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS): it’s a 36-item, self-report questionnaire 
designed to assess emotion dysregulation. The scale has high internal consistency, good test– 
retest reliability, and adequate construct and predictive validity (Gratz&Roemer, 2004). 
- Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS) aims to assesses alexithymia, that refers to inability to 
identify and describe feelings. The TAS-20 is a self-report scale comprised of 20 items, rated 
on a five-point Likert scale. In this study we used the total score to classify persons as show-
ing alexithymia (score>61), possible Alexithymia (score between 52 and 60) and no alexi-
thymia (score<51). Authors reported good factorial validity, concurrent validity and reliability 
for TAS (Bagby, et al., 1994). 
- Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS) is a questionnaire designed to assess the personali-
ty/behavioral construct of impulsiveness. The BIS-11 identifies three factors that express 
three different constructs of impulsivity: Motor impulsiveness, Impulsivity without planning 
and Cognitive impulsivity. These scales have shown a good reliability and validity with other 
measures of the same dimension and the total score of the BIS-11 is an internally consistent 
measure of impulsiveness (Patton, et al., 1995). 
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- Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) it’s a 21-question multiple-choice self-report inventory 
and it’s one of the most widely used instruments for measuring the severity of depression. 
Each response is assigned a score ranging from zero to three, indicating the severity of the 
symptom, the sum of each item provides a total score that correspond to a depression severity 
level, from mild to severe (Beck, et al., 1988).  
- Inventory of Interpersonal Problems (IIP) it’s a 57 items self-report, assessing different as-
pects of interpersonal features: interpersonal sensitivity, interpersonal ambivalence, aggres-
sion, need for social approval, and lack of sociability (Pilkonis, et al., 1996). Within this sub-
scales the Interpersonal Sensitivity as recognized as an essential feature of BPD (Trull, et al, 
2001) that predispose subjects to over-react to other people’s comment.  
- Symptom Checklist-90 (SCL-90) it’s the most used psychiatric self-report inventory as-
sessing the psychological symptom status with good psychometric qualities (Derogatis, 
1994). The Global Severity Index (GSI) of this self-report has been used in numerous studies as a 
brief indicator of mental health (Preston et al. 2002) 
4.2.5 Statistical analyses 
Sample size 
In the original study protocol, the sample size should be N=60 and it was calculated on prima-
ry outcome (MAI), assuming a change in score of 16 points on the total raw score (range 16-
80), as a significant improvement and considering a test power of 0.8 and a level of signifi-
cance of alpha of 0.05. MAI has been validated (Semerari, et al, 2012) but cut-off scores for 
clinical sample do not yet exist. A change of 16 points has been hypothesized on clinical con-
siderations, assuming that a change of 1 point (Likert scale) in a descriptor corresponds to an 
improvement in the ability manifested by the subject. Furthermore, considering drop-out rates 
reported in psychotherapy trial on BPD patients, sample size in study protocol was modified 
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in N=72, assuming a possible drop-out rate of 20%, in order to ensure at least 60 patients even 
in case of drop-out equal to 20%. Psychotherapy trial on BPD reported in fact drop-out rate 
between 10% and 45% (Bales, et al., 2013; Bateman, et al., 2009; Sempertengui, et al., 2012). 
Unfortunately, due to a delay and problems with a recruiting center, it was not possible to re-
spect this sample size and this thesis reports only data so far collected. 
 
Statistical Analyses 
Descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation for continuous variables, frequency and 
percentage for categorical variables) were used to summarize demographics and clinical fea-
tures of the study sample. Parametric and non-parametric tests (Chi-square, ANOVA and 
Kruskal Wallis test) were used to assess any differences in demographic and clinical variables 
among the three groups at baseline (Table 1). Parametric and non-parametric tests (paired T-
test and Wilcoxon tests) were used to describe the score change from baseline to follow-up.  
For the evaluation of the treatment groups (MIT, MTB) vs TAU group along the time, a series 
of linear mixed models (LMM) with time (pre and after 12-months intervention) as repeated 
factor within patients (repeated measures),  group as between factor and Bonferroni correction 
for post-hoc were performed.  
All statistical analysis were carried out by using SPSS 21.0. Statistical significance was set at 
p<0.05. 
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4.3 Results of the longitudinal study  
4.3.1 Socio-demographic and clinical characteristic of the sample 
Seventy patients were assessed for the inclusion and 45 met the inclusion criteria (see Fig. 
4.1). Twenty-five patients were excluded from the study: n=20 for different principal diagno-
sis and n=5 patients refused to participate. 
Fig. 4.1 Flow chart diagram of the longitudinal study. 
 
 
 
Fourteen patients started a MIT therapy, 16 an MBT therapy and the other 15 patients be-
longed to the TAU group. Unfortunately randomization wasn’t possible because it’s very hard 
to find in Italy clinic specialized in psychotherapy for personality disorder and usually they 
have a specific approach and are located in different cities, and none offered to patients both 
MIT and MBT. 
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The drop-out rate after 6 months was around 35% in the MIT group, 46% in TAU and 31% in 
the MBT group (in this group, five patients were not evaluated at T1 due to administrative 
problems of one involved center that avoided the prosecution of the treatment within the pro-
tocol). Differently,  the drop-out rate between 6 and 12 months was zero. 
Comparison between groups (MIT, MBT and TAU) at baseline showed that only the age and 
the age of onset resulted higher in the TAU group, but the duration of illness, that could be 
linked to some clinical variables, didn’t differ between groups (Tables 4.2-4.3). The other so-
cio-demographical variables didn’t differ, so we can compare the groups. 
 
Tab. 4.2 Comparison of socio-demographic and clinical characteristic of the three groups 
at baseline.  
 MIT  
(N=14) 
Mean (SD) 
MBT  
(N=16) 
Mean (SD) 
TAU 
(N=15) 
Mean (SD) 
ANOVA 
# F-
statistic  
p-value 
Age  31.6 (8.3) 29.2 (7.5) * 36.9 (6.2) * 4.55 0.016 * 
Education (years) 12.6 (3.4)     12.0 (2.6) 10.7 (2.2)     4.57 0.116  
Age at onset (years) 18.3 (4.8) * 18.3 (5.4) 24.2 (9.1) * 3.64 0.035 * 
Duration of illness 12.4 (8.2) 10.4 (6.3) 12.7 (7.0) 0.43 0.654 
Age at first contact 
with Psych Services 
22.1 (7.1) 22.3 (7.8) 26.7 (8.4) 1.64 0.206 
Number of DSM-IV 
BPD’s criteria 
(mean) 
6.5 (0.8) 6.9 (1.5) 6.5 (1.1) 0.56 0.574 
# Considering the groups sample size, differences among groups were evaluated also with 
non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test, obtaining consistent results with respect to ANOVA test.   
* Post-hoc significant difference 
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The majority of the sample was female (see Tab. 4.3). Half of the sample showed comorbidity 
with a SUD, Substance Abuse Disorder, lifetime and high percentage of the sample attempted 
suicide or experienced self-harm behaviors lifetime. Between 62% and 92% of the sample re-
ported to have at least one relative with a psychiatric disorder. 
 
Tab. 4.3 Comparison of socio-demographic and clinical characteristic of the three groups 
at baseline.  
 
 MIT  
(N=14) 
N (%) 
MBT 
(N=16) 
N (%) 
TAU 
(N=15) 
N (%) 
Chi-
square 
test 
p-value 
Sex (F) 10 (71.4%) 12 (75.0%) 10 (66.7%) 0.26 0.877 
Lifetime alcohol 
Abuse/Addiction  
7 (50%) 10 (62.5%) 8 (53.3%) 0.93 0.627 
Lifetime substance Abu-
se/Addiction 
8 (57.1%) 8 (53.3%) 7 (46.7%) 0.33 0.848 
Lifetime attempted suici-
de 
7 (50%) 5 (33.3%) 10 (66.7%) 3.33 0.189 
Lifetime self-harm 9 (64.3%) 10 (62.5%) 7 (46.7%) 1.47 0.479 
At least one relative with 
psych. disorder  
13 (92.9%) 10 (62.5%) 13 (86.7%) 3.50 0.174 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.4 shows comparisons on principal and secondary outcomes between the groups at 
baseline. For all the variables, both the total and sub-scale scores, resulted not statistically dif-
ferent, except for GSI of the SCL-90 scale that resulted lower in MBT group.  
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Tab. 4.4 Comparison of clinical outcomes in the three groups at baseline. 
  MIT  
(N=14) 
Mean (DS) 
MBT 
(N=16) 
Mean (DS) 
TAU 
(N=15) 
Mean  
(DS) 
ANOVA  #  
F-statistic 
p-value 
MAI Total Score 40.5  
(7.5) 
42.7  
(7.9) 
42.1  
(3.2) 
0.40 0.672 
Subscales Monitoring 11.2  
(3.1) 
11.5  
(2.1) 
10.6  
(1.2) 
0.51 0.605 
Differiantiation 9.8  
(1.6) 
10.3  
(1.8) 
10.6  
(1.2) 
0.76 0.474 
Integration 9.9  
(1.6) 
10.3  
(1.8) 
10.6 
(1.0) 
0.55 0.580 
Decentering 9.6  
(1.7) 
10.7  
(2.0) 
10.6  
(1.0) 
1.30 0.285 
TAS  Total Score 53.6  
(16.2) 
53.2 (14.5) 51.5  
(13.5) 
0.04 0.960 
DERS  Total Score 125.3 
(17.4) 
112.4 
(27.4) 
111.8  
(19.2) 
1.54 0.229 
BIS  Total Score 76.3  
(10.2) 
76.4 (15.6) 70.6  
(10.6) 
0.82 0.452 
SCL 90  GSI (Global 
Severity Index) 
1.8 * 
(0.7)  
2.5 * 
(0.5)  
2.0  
(0.6) 
3.47 0.044* 
IIP  Interpersonal 
Sensitivity 
2.7  
(0.7) 
2.7  
(1.0) 
2.3  
(0.8) 
0.70 0.505 
BDI Total Score 22.8  
(11.3) 
26.0 (12.9) 32.4  
(9.9) 
1.56 0.229 
# Considering the groups sample size, differences among groups were evaluated also with 
non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test, obtaining consistent results with respect to ANOVA test.   
* Post-hoc significant differences 
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4.3.2 Longitudinal evaluation of the primary outcomes 
 
Table 4.5 shows the score changes between baseline and 1-year follow up on primary and 
secondary outcomes within the experimental groups. MAI total score improved in MIT group, 
while worsened in the MBT group. In particular in MIT group all the subscale of the MAI, 
Monitoring, Differentiation, Integration and Decentering improved. In this group even the 
secondary outcome improved after 1 year of MIT. In particular TAS mean score decreased 
from 53.6 (sd=16.2) to 51.1 (sd=20.5), DERS score from 125.3 (sd=17.4) to 109.1 (sd=8.6), 
BIS score from 76.3 (sd=10.2) to 63.6 (sd=10.3), SCL-90 Total Score from 1.8 (sd=0.7) to 
0.7 (sd=0.9) and BDI from 22.8 (sd=11.3) to 15.7 (sd=12.4). Differently in the MBT group 
the secondary outcome didn’t improve after therapy, but the small number of the patients in 
this group could have influenced this result.  
Tab. 4.5  Score change (baseline - follow-up) of primary outcome (total score and sub-
scales scores) 
 
MIT MBT 
 
T0  
(N=14) 
Mean  
(DS) 
T1  
(N=8) 
Mean 
(DS) 
T-test p- 
value 
T0  
(N=16) 
Mean 
(DS) 
T1  
(N=5) 
Mean 
(DS) 
T-test p-
value 
MAI  
Total 
Score  
40.5  
(7.5) 
51.6  
(4.3)  
-3.78 0.009 42.7  
(7.9) 
39.2  
(6.3) 
-1.32 0.258 
MAI  
Mon 
11.2  
(3.1) 
13.7 
(0.9)  
-1.06 0.329 11.5  
(2.1) 
10.4  
(1.7) 
0.00 1.000 
MAI 
Diff 
9.8  
(1.6) 
12.7  
(0.9)  
-3.55 0.012 10.3  
(1.8) 
9.8  
(1.3) 
-0.89 0.426 
MAI  
Int 
9.9  
(1.6) 
13.0  
(1.3)  
-5.16 0.002 10.3  
(1.8) 
9.6  
(1.7) 
-2.45 0.070 
MAI  
Dec 
9.6  
(1.7) 
12.1  
(1.2)  
-4.60 0.004 10.7  
(2.0) 
9.4  
(1.7) 
-1.00 0.374 
# Considering the groups sample size, differences across time were evaluated also with non-
parametric Wilcoxon test, obtaining consistent results with respect to paired t-test.   
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The comparison between baseline score and follow-up score, (Tab. 4.5) showed a similar sit-
uation, in which MAI Total Score and all the subscale scores, except from Monitoring, dif-
fered statistically in the MIT group; whereas none of subscales changed in the MBT group. 
The linear mixed model applied for the evaluation of change across time of the MAI scores 
between MIT and TAU groups (Tab. 4.6) showed that MAI Total score improved in both 
groups, but the interaction between group and time was statistically significant, so the im-
provement during time in MIT group resulted larger than in TAU. Regarding the MAI sub-
scales instead the interaction between intervention and time wasn’t significant in Monitoring, 
and were significant in the other 3 subscales, Differentiation, Integration and Decentering.  
Tab. 4.6 Linear Mixed model for the longitudinal evaluation of MAI scores in MIT vs TAU 
group.  
 
MIT TAU Group Time Interaction 
(time x 
group) 
 
T0 
Mean 
(S.E.) 
T1 
Mean 
(S.E.) 
T0 
Mean 
(S.E.) 
T1 
Mean 
(S.E.) 
F p-
value 
F p- 
value 
F p-
value 
MAI  
Mon 
11.2 
(0.7) 
13.7 
(0.4) 
10.6 
(0.6) 
12.2 
(0.4)  
3.43 0.072 14.96 <0.000 0.77 0.387 
MAI  
Diff 
9.8 
(0.3) 
12.7 
(0.3)  
10.6 
(0.3) 
10.8 
(0.3)  
2.55 0.120 21.25 <0.000 13.92 0.001 
MAI  
Int 
9.9 
(0.4) 
13.0 
(0.4)  
10.6 
(0.4) 
11.5 
(0.4)  
1.05 0.314 27.10 <0.000 8.65 0.006 
MAI  
Dec 
9.6 
(0.5) 
12.1 
(0.5)  
10.2 
(0.4) 
10.4 
(0.5)  
1.45 0.238 8.30 0.007 6.45 0.016 
MAI  
Total 
Score 
40.5 
(1.6) 
51.6 
(1.3)  
42.1 
(1.5) 
45.0 
(1.0)  
3.10 0.086 24.33 <0.000 8.23 0.007 
 70 
Similarly, we compared MTB vs TAU score changes across time (Tab. 4.7). MAI Total score 
showed a tendency toward significance for the interaction (p=0.066) between time x group, 
while a significant interaction was observed for the subscale Monitoring.  
Tab. 4.7 Linear Mixed model for the longitudinal evaluation of MAI scores in MBT vs 
TAU group.  
 
MBT TAU Group Time Interaction 
(time x 
group) 
 
T0 
Mean 
(S.E.) 
T1 
Mean 
(S.E.) 
T0 
Mean 
(S.E.) 
T1 
Mean 
(S.E.) 
F p-value F p-
value 
F p-
value 
MAI 
Mon 
11.5 
(0.4) 
10.4 
(0.6)  
10.6 
(0.6) 
12.2 
(0.4)  
0.97 0.334 0.27 0.608 6.59 0.017 
MAI  
Diff 
10.3 
(0.4) 
9.8 
(0.5)  
10.6 
(0.3) 
10.8 
(0.3)  
2.91 0.098 0.04 0.842 0.91 0.348 
MAI  
Int 
10.3 
(0.5) 
9.6 
(0.5)  
10.6 
(0.4) 
11.5 
(0.4)  
5.41 0.027 0.02 0.897 2.81 0.104 
MAI 
Dec 
10.7 
(0.4) 
9.4 
(0.7)  
10.2 
(0.4) 
10.4 
(0.5)  
0.22 0.640 1.00 0.327 1.67 0.209 
MAI  
Total 
Score 
42.7 
(1.6) 
39.2 
(2.0)  
42.1 
(1.5) 
45.0 
(1.0)  
2.32 0.139 0.03 0.859 3.67 0.066 
 
 
 
Finally the comparison between MIT and MBT groups showed a significant interaction time-
intervention both in the MAI Total score and sub-scales. (Tab. 4.8).  
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Tab. 4.8 Linear Mixed model for the longitudinal evaluation of MAI scores in MIT vs MBT 
group.  
 
 
MIT MBT Group Time Interaction 
(time x group) 
 
T0 
Mean 
(S.E.) 
T1 
Mean 
(S.E.) 
T0 
Mean 
(S.E.) 
T1 
Mean 
(S.E.) 
F p-
value 
F p-
value 
F p-
value 
MAI  
Mon 
11.2 
(0.7) 
13.7 
(0.4) 
11.5 
(0.4) 
10.4 
(0.6)  
5.77 0.022 1.39 0.246 8.30 0.007 
MAI 
Diff 
9.8 
(0.3) 
12.7 
(0.3)  
10.3 
(0.4) 
9.8 
(0.5)  
7.10 0.012 6.72 0.015 12.93 0.001 
MAI  
Int 
9.9 
(0.4) 
13.0 
(0.4)  
10.3 
(0.5) 
9.6 
(0.5)  
6.64 0.016 4.12 0.053 10.87 0.003 
MAI  
Dec 
9.6 
(0.5) 
12.1 
(0.5)  
10.7 
(0.4) 
9.4 
(0.7)  
2.26 0.145 1.37 0.252 12.03 0.002 
MAI 
Total 
Score 
40.5 
(1.6) 
51.6 
(1.3)  
42.7 
(1.6) 
39.2 
(2.0)  
6.49 0.001 3.59 0.67 13.47 0.001 
 
 
A full evaluation of MAI score changes for all the three groups was reported in Table 4.9. The 
within factor time for MAI total score was significant (p=0.015), as well as the interaction 
time x group (p=0.001). Also for all the MAI subscales the interaction factor time x group 
was significant (Mon: p=0.007; Diff: p<0.001; Int: p=0.001; Dec: p=0.004).  
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Tab. 4.9 Linear Mixed model for the longitudinal evaluation of MAI scores in the three 
groups. 
 
 
MIT 
Mean  
(S.E.) 
MBT 
Mean  
(S.E.) 
TAU 
Mean  
(S.E.) 
Group Time Interaction 
(time x group) 
 
T0 
N=14 
T1 
N=8 
T0 
N=16 
T1 
N=5 
T0 
N=15 
T1 
N=8 
F p- 
value 
F p- 
value 
F p- 
value 
MAI  
Mon 
11.2 
(0.7) 
13.7 
(0.4) 
11.5 
(0.4) 
10.4 
(0.6)  
10.6 
(0.6) 
12.2 
(0.4)  
3.62 0.034 5.12 0.028 5.42 0.007 
MAI 
Diff 
9.8  
(0.3) 
12.7 
(0.3)  
10.3 
(0.4) 
9.8 
(0.5)  
10.6 
(0.3) 
10.8 
(0.3)  
4.46 0.017 7.51 0.009 9.06 0.000 
MAI  
Int 
9.9 
(0.4) 
13.0 
(0.4)  
10.3 
(0.5) 
9.6 
(0.5)  
10.6 
(0.4) 
11.5 
(0.4)  
4.92 0.011 7.46 0.009 7.61 0.001 
MAI  
Dec 
9.6 
(0.5) 
12.1 
(0.5)  
10.7 
(0.4) 
9.4 
(0.7)  
10.2 
(0.4) 
10.4 
(0.5)  
1.25 0.297 1.28 0.266 6.45 0.004 
MAI 
Total 
Score 
40.5 
(1.6) 
51.6 
(1.3)  
42.7 
(1.6) 
39.2 
(2.0)  
42.1 
(1.5) 
45.0 
(1.0)  
4.24 0.020 6.35 0.015 8.85 0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
With respect to MBT, it is worth nothing that the decreasing of MAI score between baseline 
and follow-up was basically due to a misleading baseline data in terms of mean score of pa-
tients who completed the treatment (baseline MAI mean scores of completers was lower than 
the corresponding mean of the whole MBT group).  The results of Mixed model carried out 
only for patients having both baseline and follow-up evaluations (completers) are reported in 
Figures from 4.10 to 4.14 and Tables from 4.10.1 to 4.14.1.   
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Fig. 4.10 Linear Mixed model for the longitudinal evaluation of Total MAI scores in com-
pleters (Bonferroni post-hoc comparison) 
 
 
Tab. 4.10.1 Linear Mixed model output of Total MAI scores in completers 
MIT 
Mean 
(SD) 
MBT 
Mean 
(SD) 
TAU 
Mean 
(SD) 
Group Time Interaction 
(time x group) 
T0 
N=8 
T1 
N=8 
T0 
N=5 
T1 
N=5 
T0 
N=8 
T1 
N=8 
F p-
value 
F p- 
value 
F p- 
value 
43.3 
(8.6) 
51.6 
(3.5)  
37.2 
(7.4) 
39.2 
(5.7)  
43.0 
(2.1) 
45.0 
(3.4)  
5.12 0.018 18.57 <0.001 5.17 0.018 
 
 
 
 
No differences were observed for MAI Total score and sub-scales score at baseline among the 
three groups (p>0.05) (Fig. 410-4.14).  
MAI total score improved in all the groups, but the change during time was larger in MIT 
than in TAU and MBT, making the interaction effect significant (p=0.018). MBT and TAU 
increased of the same score (2 points from T0 to T1) but corresponding to 5.4% and 4.6% of 
enhancing respectively (Fig. 4.10). 
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Considering MAI subscales, Monitoring improved in a similar way in MIT and TAU groups, 
while it remained stable in MBT group (Fig. 4.11- Tab. 4.11.1). MIT groups instead statisti-
cally differed from both MBT and TAU in the other Metacognitive functions: Differentiation, 
Integration and Decentering (Fig. 4.12-4.14; Tab. 4.12.1-4.14.1).  
 
Fig. 4.11 Linear Mixed model for the longitudinal evaluation of Sub-scale Monitoring 
(MAI) in completers (Bonferroni post-hoc comparison) 
 
 
 
 
Tab. 4.11.1 Linear Mixed model output of Sub-scale Monitoring scores in completers 
 
MIT 
Mean 
(SD) 
MBT 
Mean 
(SD) 
TAU 
Mean 
(SD) 
Group Time Interaction 
(time x 
group) 
T0 
N=8 
T1 
N=8 
T0 
N=5 
T1 
N=5 
T0 
N=8 
T1 
N=8 
F p-
value 
F p-
value 
F p-
value 
12.4 
(3.5) 
13.7 
(0.9) 
10.4 
(2.1) 
10.4 
(1.7)  
11.3 
(0.7) 
12.3 
(1.3)  
4.12 0.035 2.39 0.141 0.55 0.588 
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Fig. 4.12 Linear Mixed model for the longitudinal evaluation of Sub-scale Differentiating 
(MAI) in completers (Bonferroni post-hoc comparison) 
 
 
Tab. 4.12.1 Linear Mixed model output of Sub-scale Differentiating scores in completers 
MIT 
Mean 
(SD) 
MBT 
Mean 
(SD) 
TAU 
Mean 
(SD) 
Group Time Interaction 
(time x 
group) 
T0 
N=8 
T1 
N=8 
T0 
N=5 
T1 
N=5 
T0 
N=8 
T1 
N=8 
F p-
value 
F p-
value 
F p-
value 
10.4  
(1.7) 
12.7 
(1.0)  
9.2 
(2.0) 
9.8 
(1.3)  
10.5 
(1.1) 
10.9 
(0.8)  
5.70 0.013 9.54 0.007 3.21 0.066 
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Fig. 4.13 Linear Mixed model for the longitudinal evaluation of Sub-scale Integration 
(MAI) in completers (Bonferroni post-hoc comparison) 
 
 
 
Tab. 4.13.1 Linear Mixed model output of Sub-scale Integration scores in completers 
MIT 
Mean 
(SD) 
MBT 
Mean 
(SD) 
TAU 
Mean 
(SD) 
Group Time Interaction 
(time x group) 
T0 
N=8 
T1 
N=8 
T0 
N=5 
T1 
N=5 
T0 
N=8 
T1 
N=8 
F p-
value 
F p-value F p-
value 
10.1 
(1.9) 
13.0 
(1.3)  
8.4 
(2.2) 
9.6 
(1.7)  
11.0 
(0.8) 
11.5 
(0.8)  
6.62 0.007 29.411 <0.000 7.071 0.006 
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Fig. 4.14 Linear Mixed model for the longitudinal evaluation of Sub-scale Decentering 
(MAI) in completers (Bonferroni post-hoc comparison) 
 
 
 
 
 
Tab. 4.14.1 Linear Mixed model output of Sub-scale Decentering scores in completers 
MIT 
Mean 
(SD) 
MBT 
Mean 
(SD) 
TAU 
Mean 
(SD) 
Group Time Interaction 
(time x group) 
T0 
N=8 
T1 
N=8 
T0 
N=5 
T1 
N=5 
T0 
N=8 
T1 
N=8 
F p-
value 
F p-
value 
F p-
value 
10.3 
(1.8) 
12.1 
(1.2)  
9.2 
(1.6) 
9.4 
(1.7)  
10.3 
(1.2) 
10.4 
(1.5)  
2.75 0.092 9.336 0.007 6.063 0.010 
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4.3.3 Longitudinal evaluation of the secondary outcomes  
Table 4.15 showed score change (baseline - follow-up) of secondary outcomes in experi-
mental groups. In MIT group all the scales showed improvements during 1 year treatment. In 
MBT group only TAS score and IIP score improve, while the other variables worsen during 
time. However the exiguous size of the sample (due to missing data) did not allow to drive 
any robust conclusion about it.  
 
Tab. 4.15 Score change (baseline - follow-up) of secondary outcomes 
 
MIT MBT 
 T0 
N=14 
Mean 
(SD) 
T1 
N=7 
Mean 
(SD) 
T test p-value T0 
N=15 
Mean 
(SD) 
T1 
N=3 
Mean 
(SD) 
T test p-value 
TAS  53.6 
(16.2) 
51.1 
(20.5) 0.95 0.377 
53.2 
(14.5) 
51.3 
(13.3) 0.23 0.837 
DERS  125.3 
(17.4) 
109.1 
(8.6) 1.15 0.295 
112.4 
(27.4) 
125.3 
(15.1) -1.44 0.287 
BIS  76.3 
(10.2) 
63.6 
(10.3) 1.97 0.096 
76.4 
(15.6) 
85.3 
(17.9) -033 0.776 
SCL 90  1.8  
(0.7) 
0.7 
(0.9) 4.46 0.004 
2.5  
(0.5) 
2.4 
 (1.0) 0.00 1.000 
IIP  2.7  
(0.7) 
1.7 
(0.5) 1.00 0.356 
2.7  
(1.0) 
1.7  
(0.6) 0.00 1.000 
BDI 22.8 
(11.3) 
15.7 
(12.4) 1.94 0.101 
26.0 
(12.9) 
27,7 
(12.6) -0.30 0.791 
 
# Considering the groups sample size, differences across time were evaluated also with non-
parametric Wilcoxon test, obtaining consistent results with respect to paired t-test.   
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The exiguous size of the sample at 12 months didn’t permit to run other analysis except the 
explorative ones on MIT versus TAU group for which a major number of data were collected 
(Tab. 4.16).  
Tab. 4.16 Linear Mixed model for the longitudinal evaluation of  secondary outcomes in 
MIT vs TAU group.  
 
 
MIT 
Mean 
(SE) 
TAU 
Mean 
(SE) 
Group Time Interaction 
(time x group) 
 
T0 T1 T0 T1 F p-
value 
F p- 
value 
F p- 
value 
BIS 76.2 
(2.9) 
63.5 
(5.0) 
70.6 
(3.1) 
65.8 
(4.7) 
0.181 0.674 4.778 0.039 0.938 0.343 
BDI 22.9 
(3.0) 
15.7 
(4.4) 
32.4 
(4.1) 
21.0 
(8.3) 
1.938 0.191 3.020 0.109 0.162 0.695 
DERS 125.3 
(5.1) 
109.1 
(14.7) 
111.8 
(5.5) 
90.9 
(13.7) 
2.200 0.157 3.004 0.102 0.050 0.826 
TAS 53.6 
(4.3) 
51.1 
(7.6) 
51.5 
(6.3) 
54.5 
(14.2) 
0.005 0.946 0.001 0,977 0.094 0.765 
IIP 2.2 
(0.2) 
1.7 
(0.3) 
1.8 
(0.2) 
1.3 
(0.3) 
2.466 0.127 4.189 0.049 0.803 0.776 
SCL-90 1.763 
(0.2) 
1.609 
(0.2) 
2.027 
(0.3) 
1.413 
(0.3) 
0.019 0.890 2.505 0.127 0.904 0.352 
 
 
 
The improvement in secondary outcomes in MIT was larger than TAU in the most of the var-
iables, anyway the differences were not statistically significant.  
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Finally, we verified if the relations among primary and secondary outcomes detected in the 
cross-sectional study (analyzed by structural equation model -SEM- and reported in Figure 
3.8, pag.45) hold also across time in MIT group. The sample size at T1 for the secondary 
outcomes avoid us to use SEM, so that we decided to evaluate the relationships among 
clinical scales in two steps (Tab. 4.17- Fig. 4.18).  
Tab. 4.17 Linear Mixed model for the longitudinal evaluation of relationships of primary 
and secondary outcomes in MIT group .  
 
STEP 1                         Dependent variable DERS Beta p-value 
Independent variables 
MAI Total Score 
TAS (as mediator) 
Dependent variable TAS 
MAI Total Score 
 
- 1.00 
1.11 
 
-0.78 
 
0.169 
0.001 
 
0.218 
 
STEP 2                       Independent variable DERS   
Dependent variables 
BDI score 
IIP Interpersonal Sensitivity 
GSI (Global Severity Index SCL-90) 
BIS Total score 
 
0.32 
0.01 
0.02 
0.13 
 
0.001 
0.020 
0.005 
0.167 
 
 
In particular, we first evaluated, through linear mixed models, the relations across time among 
DERS (as dependent variable) and MAI and TAS (as independent and mediator variable 
respectively).  
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Then, by other four univariate mixed models (adjusted for time effect), we analyzed the 
relationships between BIS, BDI, IPP and GSI (as dependent variables of four different 
models) and DERS (as independent variable) (see Tab. 4.17). 
 
 
Fig. 4.18 Graphical representation of Linear Mixed Models output  for STEP 1 & STEP 2 
 
 
 
 
 
Differently it was found for the cross-sectional study carried out on the whole sample (N=45) 
at baseline, the relationship between MAI TAS and DERS across time for MIT group showed 
a different path. Instead, the relations between DERS and the other clinical variables hold for 
BDI, IPP and GSI.  It is worth to note that these results were affected by the small sample size 
(N=7) that influence the significance.    
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4.4 Discussion of the longitudinal study 
   Different psychotherapies for BPD has different specific aims but, as suggested by Gabbard 
in an interesting editorial (Gabbard, 2007), probably “all the roads lead to Rome” i.e. different 
therapies try to get the same target through different “roads”. In a shortened and simplified 
way, DBT (Linehan, et al. 2006) works directly to reduce ED, while MBT (Bate-
man&Fonagy, 2006) and MIT (Dimaggio&Semerari, 2007) is focused on the improvement of 
metacognition/mentalization to reduce ED in an “indirect way”. Conversely, a recent article 
concludes that mentalizing is present in some DBT technique too, even if it’s not explicit 
(Swenson&Choi-Khan, 2015).  
    In our study metacognition functions were evaluated after one year of MBT and MIT in or-
der to verify if these functions improve in a different way in these two approaches and com-
paring to a TAU group. Despite the international guidelines indicating psychotherapy as the 
“gold standard” for personality disorder, it’s uncommon to find evidence-based psychothera-
py in psychiatric services in Italy (Nicolò&Pompili, 2012). Moreover each service has specif-
ic approach, so it was impossible to find a single center to run this study or at least two cen-
ters in the same city, so it was impossible to randomize patients to the different experimental 
groups. The lack of randomization make our study less reliable and generalizable than a ran-
domized one, but the lack of differences at baseline for the outcomes between the three 
groups let us compare the groups and permit to draw some consideration, even if prudent.  
Furthermore the high percentage of drop-out in psychotherapy of BPD (Wnuk et al. 2013) 
gets more difficult to recruit a big enough sample for longitudinal study, as happened in our 
sample in which around 35% drop-out from treatment before 6 months. An interesting review 
on this topic (Barnicot et al., 2011) shows a great heterogeneity in the completion rates rang-
ing from 36% to80%, so research on the psychological processes involved in dropping out of 
treatment are still needed (Goldman&Gregory, 2010). However, interestingly, in our sample 
the drop-out rate between 6 months and the end of treatment in the experimental group was 
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zero and we could presume that the development of a strong therapeutic alliance could be one 
predictor of drop-out. Factors predicting dropout in BPD in fact included commitment to 
change and a strong therapeutic relationship (Barnicot et al., 2011).  
  Moving from these assumptions, the complexity of the management of this disorder started 
on the diagnosis itself. In our study 20 patients was excluded because the principal diagnosis 
was different, even if they received this diagnosis incorrectly in the past. The lack of a com-
prehensive model can count for the diagnostic difficulties and even the new DSM-5 (APA, 
2013) didn’t solve definitively the discussion about BPD diagnosis. Overlap of symptoms 
with other psychiatric disorders and high frequency of comorbidities makes diagnosis of bor-
derline personality disorder a challenge (Biskin, et al, 2012). Moreover BPD is a clinical di-
agnosis, with no supporting laboratory or imaging tests. Even the core pathological features 
remain in debate (Linneahn, 2006; Bateman&Fonagy, 2004) but there is a broad consensus 
supporting the current categorical criteria of DSM-5, the same of DSM-IV (APA, 2000), 
while the new DSM-5 dimensional criteria (see Fig. 6.2 in Appendix) remains only an alter-
native for the moment, and not a substitution (APA, 2013).  
   The high number of comorbidities, as reported in our sample too, beyond diagnostic diffi-
culties, make the treatment more complicate and could change the priorities of the interven-
tion. Moreover clinicians who treat patients with PD face more than just the symptoms of the 
disorder; they also are often faced with patients who have significant difficulty in describing 
and reflecting on mental states and are often unable to use what unique knowledge they have 
about themselves and others to resolve social and psychological challenges (Dimaggio et al, 
2015). These difficulty are the metacognitive abilities, primary outcomes of this study.  
   Patients of our sample showed at baseline deficits in metacognition analogous to what re-
ported by the author of the MAI interview in a similar BPD sample (Semerari, et al., 2015). 
Moreover also the score on metacognitive sub-functions were similar, and showed that poor 
differentiation and poor integration seem to be the “typically borderline” metacognitive pro-
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file, consistent with previous studies (Semerari et al, 2014) and several clinical observations 
(Bateman and Fonagy, 2004). The Total scores on MAI and the sub-scales scores were very 
similar to what reported by Semerari (Semerari et al, 2014) and they both correspond to a 
moderate level of deficit in Metacognition. Poor differentiation implies that the individual 
perceives his/her own representations not as subjective and hypothetical scenarios but as a 
fact (Bateman and Fonagy, 2004). Borderline patients are impulsive and they have a tendency 
to act out; it is plausible that differentiation deficits plays a role in generating their behavioral 
dyscontrol. Dysfunctional integration, on the other hand, means that the subject finds difficult 
to reflect on the contradictions inherent in his own thoughts and feelings. A specific impair-
ment of integration is consistent with the difficulties of these patients in forming a stable self-
image and stable representations of interpersonal relations (Semerari et al, 2015). Finally def-
icits in decentering could be linked to the lack of cognitive empathy observed in other studies 
(New et al., 2012, Hengartner et al., 2014).  So, Metacognition functions seemed to be in-
volved both in internal and interpersonal process and they can help to explain also their im-
pairments in social functioning. According to two famous longitudinal study on BPD, called 
CLPS (Gunderson et al, 2011) and MSCAD (Zanarini, et al, 2014), lasting respectively 10 
and 16 years, although sustained symptomatic remission is common, only 20% of BPD pa-
tients showed good social function after 10-16 years. The reasons of these results can be 
found in one hand to the affective dysregulation, impulsivity and anger proneness, but on the 
other hand to frequent misunderstanding and experiences of being rejected and offended by 
others (Herpertz et al, 2014). Metacognition deficits, maladaptive attachment and invalidating 
environment contribute to these misunderstanding and negative experiences in complex caus-
al ways (Fonagy&Bateman, 2016) and psychotherapy for BPD has to keep in consideration 
all these factors.  Moreover clinicians should be aware that the development of a working alli-
ance might feel frightening to patients early in treatment (Fonagy et al, 2016). Some patients 
might experience the relationship as a threat because of its potential to evoke painful reflec-
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tions that may emerge. How to manage the therapy relationship to promote metacognition and 
mentalization are described by proponents of both approaches (Bateman & Fonagy, 2006; 
Dimaggio et al., 2015; Lysaker et al., 2013) and probably it’s the harder part of the psycho-
therapeutic work with these patients. To test if one year therapy can promote improvement in 
metacognition and consequently in other clinical variables we assessed metacognitive func-
tions with MAI at baseline and after 1 year. To our knowledge it’s the first time that longitu-
dinal data on MAI Interview were analyzed, so it’s hard to discuss this findings, that moreo-
ver are referred to a very small sample size.  
     The improvement in MAI Total score in MIT seemed a promising result because is statis-
tically and clinically different from TAU, although the small sample size and even if the 
change is smaller than the significant change set in the original protocol. The change in MBT 
group instead was not significant, but these results cannot drive to any conclusion for at least 
four reasons. First of all the number of completers (with both data at baseline and follow-up) 
in MBT were just five, and in addition these patients show lower mean score on MAI at base-
line and lower GSI Index, indicating a major severity. Moreover other longitudinal study on 
MBT considered longer therapy period, between 18 to 36 months (Laurenssen, et al, 2014). 
Finally another limitation was the use of MAI as the primary outcome measure, that could 
have foster MIT group because the author of the interview are the same of the MIT approach 
too. Beyond these premises and considering as preliminary these results, we could make some 
hypothesis starting from longitudinal sub-scale analysis. As shown in Fig. 4.11-4.14 the so 
called “typically Borderline” metacognitive deficits (Semerari et al, 2014) in Differentiating 
and Integration improved in both MIT and MBT groups. These trends were interesting from a 
clinical point of view and the lack of statistically significance can be due to the very small 
sample size and should be replicate in a large sample. Also the smaller improvement in Moni-
toring in MBT vs MIT can be interestingly linked to differences in therapy, with a more ex-
plicit approach to improve monitoring emotions in MIT and a more implicit in MBT. MIT 
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used in fact cognitive-behavioral therapy (Semerari, et al, 2008) in which explicitly therapist 
and patients works together to recognize and name emotions, and therapist improve this func-
tion with psychoeducational approach. In MBT instead the change in mentalization is ob-
tained in a implicit (unconscious) way through the therapeutic relationship, so the recognition 
and naming of the emotions and specific mental states is not one of the main aim of the thera-
py. Moreover the low metacognitive profile of the completers in MBT group could have in-
fluenced all the results, as shown in other study (Gulestag,et al, 2012) in which baseline Men-
talization, measured by Reflective Function (RF), was a moderator of the therapy effect. In 
particular in the first phase of the therapy patients with an higher RF at baseline improved 
more than patients with low RF, but this effect did not endure through the second period of 
the treatments (i.e., from 8 to 36 months). So we could speculate that the small improvement 
shown by our MBT sample would be larger with a better baseline MAI score and with a long-
er follow-up.  
    The secondary clinical outcomes of the study improved after 1 year of MIT, and even if the 
differences were not statistically significant, these were interesting data in order to deepen the 
study of the effect of MIT. Unfortunately the number of data at follow-up were small because 
at the initial small sample size and high number of drop-out we had to add some data missing 
on self reports, that make impossible to run other analysis on these data. As I mentioned be-
fore, it would be very interesting to replicate these analysis on a larger sample, in which we 
expect that differences could be also statistically significant. The correlation between DERS 
and TAS, BDI e IIP during time could be studied to deepen the relationships between these 
variables during time. In particular it would be interesting to verify the Structured Equation 
Model shown in study 1 with longitudinal data, but we’d need longer follow-up and especial-
ly a larger sample. We could speculate that TAS score or maybe Monitoring function score 
could be a mediator between the “typically borderline” metacognitive functions and emotion 
dysregulation that influence directly symptoms. If this hypothesis would be confirmed we 
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could guess that psychotherapy focused on metacognition/mentalization works on this 
“roads” while it would be interesting test the same idea with a different kind of psychothera-
py, for example DBT (Linnehan, 1993) to verify if to work more directly on emotion dysregu-
lation led to change in mentalization too, as speculated by Swenson et al (2015). In this inter-
esting paper authors compared MBT and DBT to verify that even if the two approach origi-
nate from different theories, they share common elements. In DBT the therapist, having estab-
lished a secure and important attachment relationship, stays focused on behavioral targets, and 
brings problem-solving tools, including skills, to help the patient be able to change. Anyway 
during these work mentalization/metacognition is needed and probably it develop during 
treatment, so an RCT with larger number and comparing MIT, MBT and DBT could help to 
better understand the role of metacognition and emotional regulation in BPD and the mecha-
nism of change in therapy.  
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4.5 Strengths and limitations 
This study has both strengths and limitations. It’s the first study comparing directly MIT and 
MBT and using such a specific outcome on metacognition. The principal limitation of this 
study is due to its non-randomized design and the small sample size. Although we did not re-
veal any differences at baseline for the outcomes, the lack of randomization make our study 
less reliable and generalizable than a randomized one. Nonetheless it’s very hard to find in It-
aly clinic specialized in psychotherapy for personality disorder and usually they have a specif-
ic approach and are located in different cities so it would be impossible to randomized pa-
tients to different approaches. The other main limitation is due to the small sample size that 
can affect the generalization of our results. Finally outcome was tested almost exclusively by 
using self-report  measures, except of metacognition, and it would be interesting to assess the 
same variables with other kind of measures.  
Beyond these limitations, recent influential review reported that existing therapies for border-
line personality disorder remain experimental, and more “real-world” studies are necessary 
(Stoffers et al, 2012).  
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Chapter 5: CONCLUSION 
 
   In conclusion these results showed the central role of metacognition, alexithymia and emo-
tion dysregulation in BPD and their relationship with symptomatology. The second study fo-
cused on longitudinal results of psychotherapy could help to deepen this topic, but further 
studies are needed.  
Structural Equation Model results shown in cross-sectional study linked together MAI score, 
DERS score and clinical variables, and in particular showed that alexithymia was a mediator 
between metacognitive functions and emotion dysregulation (ED) and ED seemed to explain 
symptoms. Longitudinal results seemed to confirm the central role of Metacognition functions 
and ED in BPD psychotherapy even if the result were not robust due to the small sample size, 
that can affect the generalization of our results.  
   It has been demonstrated that metacognition functions and emotion dysregulation play an 
important role in BPD. In particular metacognition skills emerges in the context of the infant-
caregiver relationship through early affect mirroring and is essential to the development of in-
ter-subjectivity (Fonagy&Bateman, 2004) and emotion regulation, and our study deepen this 
topic. It seemed that Alexithymia mediate between these two aspects, probably linking to-
gether aspects measured by TAS sub-scales: “Difficulties in Describing/Identifying emotions” 
and “Monitoring” of metacognition abilities in one hand and “Externally-Oriented Thinking” 
with Emotion Dysregulation on the other hand. Moreover ED seemed to predict symptoms, in 
accordance with the study by Glenn (2009) in which ED exhibits a robust and unique rela-
tionship with BPD symptomatology.  
    Between metacognitive functions, deficit in differentiating and integrating appeared as cen-
tral for this disorder, in accordance with other study (Semerari et al, 2015; Bateman&Fonagy, 
2004). These patients showed problems with the ability to differentiate between representa-
tion and reality (differentiation), oscillating between a state where every representation is ex-
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perienced as real and a state where the outside world seems imaginary and unreal (Bate-
man&Fonagy, 2006; Semerari et al, 2014). Moreover BPD patients typically failed in integra-
tion, as reported already by Clarkin et al. (1999), who emphasized the BPD patient’s inability 
to consider multiple and contradictory representations of himself/herself and of others. Re-
sults of this study showed a significant improvement in these functions after 1 year of MIT 
therapy and a similar trend, even if not significant, in MBT group. Changes in these functions 
are crucial for this disorder and the results of our study it’s promising because they’re signifi-
cant even with the small sample size. Unfortunately we couldn’t drive any conclusion about 
the mechanism of change of these two different psychotherapy approaches, but it would be 
interesting to deepen this topic and understand how “two different roads” drive to such a simi-
lar destination. Results on correlations between changes during time in Emotion Dysregula-
tion and the other clinical variables seemed promising and they could let us to speculate about 
the relationships these variables. 
In conclusion, we can consider Prometeo Project as a pilot study that had highlighted some 
interesting sparks to be considered to plan an RCT with a larger sample on this topic in the fu-
ture to confirm our results. 
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Chapter 6. APPENDIX 
 
Fig. 6.1:  DSM-IV criteria for Borderline Personality disorder (APA, 2000) 
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Fig. 6. 2: DSM-5 criteria for Borderline Personality disorder (APA, 2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6.3: Pharmacological Guideline - Part 1 (APA, 2001) 
Fig. 6.4: Pharmacological Guideline - Part 2 (APA, 2001) 
 
_ criteria A: moderate or greater impairment in personality functioning, manifested by characteristic diffi-
culties in two or more of the following areas:  
 1. IDENTITY: markedly impoverished, poorly developed, or unstable self-image, often  associated 
with excessive criticism; chronic feelings of emptiness, dissociative states under  stress.  
 2. SELF-DIRECTION:  instability in goals, aspiration, values or career plans. 
 3. EMPATHY: compromised ability to recognized the feelings and needs of other associated 
 with interpersonal hypersensitivity; perception of others selectively biased toward negative  at-
tributes or vulnerabilities. 
 4. INTIMACY: intense, unstable, and conflicted close relationships, marked by mistrust,  neediness, 
and anxious preoccupation with real or imagined abandonment; close relationship often viewed in extremes 
of idealization and devaluation and alternating between  overinvolvement and withdrawal. 
 
_ criteria B: four or more of the following seven pathological personality traits, at least one of  which 
must be (5) Impulsivity, (6) Risk taking, (7) Hostility:  
 
 1. Emotional Lability (an aspect of Negative Affectivity):  unstable emotional experiences 
 and frequent mood changes; emotions that are easily aroused, intense and/or out of  proportion 
to events and circumstances. 
 
 2. Anxiousness (an aspect of Negative Affectivity):  intense feelings of nervousness,  tenseness, 
or panic, often reaction to interpersonal stresses; worry about the negative  effects of past  unpleasant expe-
riences and future negative possibilities; feeling fearful,  apprehensive, or threatened by uncertainty; 
fears of falling apart or losing control.  
 
 3. Separation insecurity (an aspect of Negative Affectivity): fears of rejection by-and/or  separation 
from- significant others, associated with fears of excessive dependency and  complete loss of auton-
omy.  
 
 4. Depressivity (an aspect of Negative Affectivity): frequent feelings of being down,  miserable, 
and/or hopeless;  difficulty recovering from such moods; pessimism about the  future; pervasive shame; 
feelings of inferior self-worth; thoughts of suicide or suicide  behavior. 
 
 5. Impulsivity (an aspect of Disinhibition): acting on the spur of the moment in response to 
 immediate stimuli; acting on a momentary basis without a plan or consideration of  outcomes; 
difficulty establishing or following plans; a sense of urgency and shelf-harming  behavior under emotional 
distress. 
 
 6. Risk taking (an aspect of Disinhibition): engagement in dangerous, risky, and potentially 
 self-damaging activities, unnecessarily and without regard to consequences, lack of concern  for 
one’s limitation and denial of the reality of personal danger.  
 
 7. Hostility (an aspect of Antagonism): persistent or frequent angry feelings, anger or  irritability 
in response to minor slights and insults.  
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Fig. 6.3: Pharmacological Guideline - Part 1 (APA, 2001) 
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Fig. 6.4: Pharmacological Guideline - Part 2 (APA, 2001) 
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Fig. 6.5: Pharmacological Guideline - Part 3 (APA, 2001) 
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Fig. 6.6 Metacognition Assessment Interview (MAI) scoring sheet 
 
                                                                                                                          
  SCORE  
(range 1-5) 
MONITORING (MON) (a) the ability to recognize one’s own representa-
tions (thoughts and beliefs);  
 
 (b) the ability to recognize and verbalize one’s 
own emotions;  
 
 (c) the ability to establish relations among the 
separate components of a mental state; and  
 
 (d) the ability to establish relations between the 
components of mental states and behavior.  
 
 TOTAL MONITORING (range 4-20)  
   
INTEGRATION (INT) (a) the ability to describe understandable and co-
herent links among thoughts, events, actions and 
behaviors;  
 
 (b) the ability to describe transitions among dif-
ferent mental states and explain the reasons why; 
 
 (c) the ability to form generalized representations 
of his/her mental functioning, taking into account 
continuity over time of patterns of thinking and 
feeling;  
 
 (d) the ability to reconstruct and describe to the 
interviewer one’s own mental functioning, 
providing enough information, without giving ir-
relevant and out-of-focus details, and giving a 
sense of order and coherence to the discourse.  
 
 TOTAL INTEGRATION (range 4-20)  
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DIFFERENTIATION 
(DIF) 
(a) the ability to consider one’s own representa-
tion of the world as subjective and questionable; 
 
 (b) the ability to give plausible interpretations of 
events;  
 
 (c) the ability to reflect on and evaluate events (as 
opposed to a tendency to act impulsively);  
 
 (d) the ability to distinguish between different 
modes of thoughts such as dreaming, fantasizing 
and imagining.  
 
 TOTAL DIFFERENTIATION (range 4-20)  
   
DECENTERING (DEC) (a) the ability to recognize, define and verbalize 
other people’s emotional inner state;  
 
 (b) the ability to recognize, define and verbalize 
other people’s cognitive inner state;  
 
 (c) the ability to establish relations among the 
separate components of others’ mental state; and  
 
 (d) the ability to establish relations between the 
components of others’ mental state and their be-
havior.  
 
 TOTAL DECENTERING (range 4-20)  
   
 TOTAL MAI SCORE (range 16-80)  
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Fig. 6.7 Baseline Data Sheet 
 
Progetto ProMeTeO 
PROTOCOLLO DI RILEVAZIONE DATI BASELINE pag.1/2 
 
CODICE PAZIENTE__________________________________________________________ 
 
DATA RILEVAZIONE________________________________________________________ 
 
 
DATI ANAGRAFICI 
Data di nascita: ____________ Sesso: [F]     [M]               Scolarità (anni)___________ 
Stato civile:  
1_[nubile/celibe]  2_[coniugata/o]  3_[separata/o-divorziata/o]  4_[vedova/o]   5_[convivente] 
Condizione lavorativa:  
1_[disoccupato]  2_[invalido]  3_[occupazione protetta]  4_[occupazione non protetta] 
5_studente 
 
INFORMAZIONI CLINICHE 
Diagnosi principale: _________________________ 
Comorbidità asse I: ______________________________________________________ 
Comorbidità asse II: ______________________________________________________ 
Età di esordio malattia psichiatrica:_____________ 
Durata di malattia: _____________ 
Età primo contatto con i servizi psichiatrici:__________ 
Numero ricoveri in SPDC nel corso della vita_____________ 
Numero di ricoveri in altri servizi psichiatrici______________  
Tipologia: [1]  comunità terapeutiche [2] cliniche specialistiche  [3] altro __________ 
Precedenti psicoterapie [SI’]   [NO]  Durata (mesi)_______________    Tipolo-
gia___________ 
Familiarità psichiatrica [SI’]   [NO]     
Abuso di alcool  [SI’]   [NO]  
Storia dell’abuso di alcool: [attuale]   [pregresso]    N° anni______________________ 
Abuso di sostanze  [SI’]   [NO]     (35) Tipologia: [Monoabuso] [Poliabuso] 
Sostanza/e______________________________________________________________ 
Storia dell’abuso di sostanze: [attuale]   [pregresso]   N° anni______________________ 
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PROTOCOLLO DI RILEVAZIONE DATI BASELINE pag.2/2 
 
Esperienze traumatiche/stressanti [SI’]   [NO]  Tipologia___________________________ 
Tentativi di suicidio [SI’]   [NO]  Numero di tentativi di suicidio: ___________________ 
Autolesionismo [SI’]   [NO]   Frequenza: [saltuaria] [abituale] Modali-
tà___________________ Eteroaggressività [SI’]  [NO]  Frequenza: [saltuaria] [abituale] 
CRITERI DIAGNOSTICI BPD 
Sforzi disperati di evitare un reale o immaginario abbandono [SI’]   [NO]   
Un quadro di relazioni interpersonali instabili e intense, caratterizzate dall’alternanza tra gli 
estremi di iperidealizzazione e svalutazione [SI’]   [NO]   
Disturbi dell’identità: sé instabile  [SI’]   [NO]   
Impulsività in almeno due aree che sono potenzialmente dannose per il soggetto (quali spen-
dere, sesso, abuso di sostanze, guida spericolata, abbuffate) [SI’]   [NO]   
Ricorrenti minacce, gesti, comportamenti suicidari o comportamento automutilante [SI’]   
[NO]   
Instabilità affettiva (durata breve) [SI’]   [NO]   
Vuoto  [SI’]   [NO]   
Rabbia immotivata e intensa o difficoltà a controllare la rabbia (esempio frequenti accessi di 
ira o rabbia costante o ricorrenti scontri fisici) [SI’]   [NO]   
Ideazione paranoie transitoria e legata allo stress o sintomi dissociativi  [SI’]   [NO]   
TERAPIA FARMACOLOGICA 
Antipsicotici tipici [SI’]   [NO]   Antipsicotici atipici [SI’]   [NO]    
SSRI [SI’]   [NO] SNRI [SI’]   [NO] Triciclici [SI’]   [NO]    IMAO [SI’]   [NO]    
Stabilizzatori dell’umore [SI’]   [NO]    
Benzodiazepine [SI’]   [NO]    
FARMACI NON PSICHIATRICI: ___________________________________ 
COMORBIDITA’ MEDICHE:  
Tiroide  [SI’]   [NO]    Diabete   [SI’]   [NO]    Epatite   [SI’]   [NO]    
HIV  [SI’]   [NO]     Trauma cranico  [SI’]   [NO]     Ipertensione  [SI’]   [NO]      
Anemia [SI’]   [NO]     Ictus/TIA [SI’]   [NO]     Altro, specificare___________________ 
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